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ARTICLES
THE EQUALITY TRAP:
How RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL
CIVIL RIGHTS CONCEPTS
HAS RENDERED TITLE I OF THE ADA
INEFFECTIVE
James Leonardt
"Every silver lining's got a touch of grey.
Anyone who has taught disability law for nearly fifteen years and
studied it for longer, as I have, knows that people with disabilities
often live on the margins of American society. Congress's finding in
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the "Act") that "society
has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities ' 2 was
not a rhetorical flourish. A humane society does not keep its constitu-
ents at arm's length. When the ADA was enacted in 1990, I thought
that it was a silver lining emerging from a dark history of marginali-
zation. I was moved by the promise that Title I of the ADA would
open up the workplace to persons with disabilities. In the intervening
years, the silver tones of optimism have turned grey and sometimes
black. Employment levels for persons with disabilities appear to have
declined since Title I came into effect. The primary reason for this
1 Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. I would like to extend my
thanks to Dean Kenneth C. Randall and The University of Alabama School of Law Foundation
for their support of this research through a generous grant. Penny Gibson of the Bounds Law
Library was effective as usual in obtaining several items via interlibrary loan. Peggy McIntosh,
as always, provided first-rate assistance with preparing the manuscript. And, heartfelt thanks to
my wife, Professor Joanne C. Brant of Ohio Northern University's Pettit College of Law, for her
critical reading of the text with the eye of a Title VII expert. All mistakes remain my own.
GRATEFUL DEAD, Touch of Grey, on IN THE DARK (Arista Records 1987).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2) (2000).
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failure, I have now concluded, is that it was a mistake to base disabil-
ity policy in the workplace on traditional civil rights principles.
I. INTRODUCTION
People with disabilities, like any other group within American
society, seek and value equality. Such ambitions are hardly
surprising. Equality is an axiom of modem American law. The
Supreme Court has consistently viewed the Equal Protection Clause
as a directive that state actors treat similarly situated persons alike.3
Congress, in turn, has extended the equality principle to broad swaths
of society with such enactments as the Civil Rights Act of 19644 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.5 To some, however, the
notion of equality signifies more than a careful weighing of situations
by the courts to judge comparability. According to this enhanced
egalitarian view, practical consequences should flow from the
achievement of equality. An equal should be a full participant in
society, able to enjoy the full benefits of the American experience and
to take up the corresponding-and ennobling-responsibility of
complying with a citizen's obligations. She should not feel
marginalized, ignored, or excluded.
Concerns over exclusion are particularly acute in the area of em-
ployment, the subject of this Article. In contemporary America, get-
ting and keeping a decent job is the key to leading a self-sufficient life
endowed with the qualities of dignity, independence, and personal
autonomy. Legislation, such as Title II of the ADA,6 may well prove
to be successful in forcing state and local governments to treat con-
stituents with disabilities on an evenhanded or inclusive basis. Title
III of the Act7 may do the same for the public accommodations that
we all depend upon in daily life, such as schools, grocery stores, and
doctors' offices. Without the prospect of employment, however, an
individual faces a life of dependence and may never experience the
sense of inclusive equality that other members of society take for
granted.
3 See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall
'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially
a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." (quoting Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982))).
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
5 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (2000).
7 Id. §§ 12181-12189.
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Enactment of the ADA, Title I of which governs employment, was
a watershed event in the attempt to extend principles of equality to
persons with disabilities. The Act was the culmination of a political
and social movement towards regarding disability status as a civil
rights issue that should be addressed through antidiscrimination rules.
As late as the mid-twentieth century, the prevailing approach was the
so-called medical model. 8 Disabilities were regarded as a medical
condition either to be cured or ameliorated by charity and government
welfare programs providing rehabilitation, cash transfers, or medical
services.9 Other regulations, such as those effectuating section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, 10 created an antidiscrimination mandate in a
wide range of activities, such as employment and public services.
Those rules, however, only applied to recipients of federal funds and,
along with section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act," to federal agencies.
Generally speaking, the ADA took the section 504 antidiscrimination
scheme and applied it to American society as a whole, regardless of
federal funding.12
Rejection of the medical/welfare model of disability policy by per-
sons with disabilities was understandable and in many ways com-
mendable. A public policy that views individuals with disabilities as
permanently "sick," however well intentioned, runs the risk of dispir-
iting and dehumanizing its would-be beneficiaries. Disability advo-
cates have complained sharply about the paternalistic attitudes of
caseworkers 3 and about the culture of dependence caused by reliance
8 See generally Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 875-76 (2004) [hereinafter Crossley, Reason-
able Accommodations] (discussing the medical model of disability); Jonathan C. Drimmer,
Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legisla-
tion and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1347-48 (1993)
(same); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1047-51
(2004) (same); Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213,214-17 (2000) (same); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's
Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 335-36
(2001) (same).
9 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (2004) [here-
inafter Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law].
10 Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
1Id. § 791.
12 See, e.g., Laura Rothstein, Disability Law and Higher Education: A Road Map For
Where We've Been And Where We May Be Heading, 63 MD. L. REV. 122, 133 (2004) ("The
primary goal of the ADA was to extend the protections of section 504 to a much broader seg-
ment of society.").
13 See, e.g., Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare,
54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 831 (1966) (criticizing caseworkers' practice of forcing conformity upon
charges). See generally Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 9, at 14 (discussing
paternalism in welfare services); Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:
Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1137-38 (2000)
(reviewing complaints about welfare caseworkers' abuse of discretion).
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on welfare programs. 14 Perhaps the most striking complaint was that
welfare-based systems deprive recipients of the full rights of citizen-
ship by excusing them from performing certain social obligations,
such as work.1
5
No doubt resentful of the medical view of disability, theorists
within the disability rights movement have attempted to recast dis-
ability as a social phenomenon. Under the "social model" of disabil-
ity, impairments arise from the interaction between a person and her
environment. 16 Individuals with disabilities experience impediments
to success because society has erected barriers to their participation in
society. Such barriers take many forms, such as physically inaccessi-
ble buildings, inadequate transportation, or failures to communicate in
a particular media, such as Braille. The social model treats the lack of
accommodations for persons with disabilities as a form of social neg-
ligence caused by a failure to appreciate their particular needs. For
example, a decision to construct a multistory building with stairs but
no elevator or ramps reflects an assumption either that all building
users are able to use the stairs or that the presence of others is unde-
sirable. 17 In either case, the building owner's decisions caused argua-
bly avoidable disabling effects.1
8
To a great extent, the ADA embodies the social model of disabil-
ity. The Findings and Purposes section of the ADA treats disability
discrimination as an attitudinal failure by society. Section 2 of the Act
attributes discrimination to
outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifica-
tions to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualifi-
cation standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to
lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities. 19
This is the language of social neglect. Aside from a single, initial
reference to intentional discrimination, the section describes how so-
ciety has failed to take into account the needs of persons with disabili-
14 Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 9, at 16-17.
15 Id. at 17-18.
16 E.g., id. at 12; Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
621, 654 (1999) [hereinafter Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope].
17 See Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, supra note 16, at 654.
18 For a discussion of Title I's reasonable accommodations mandate as an expression of
the social model, see infra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
19 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5) (2000).
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ties. The lack of any reference to the inherent limitations of impair-
ments strengthens the impression that Congress viewed disability as
an artifact of attitude.
To combat what it viewed as artificial and needless exclusions
from society, Congress took an "integrationist '20 approach to
disabilities in the ADA. For example, section 2(8) of the Act states
that disability policy should "assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
such individuals."' 21 Put simply, Congress wished to move beyond the
traditional civil rights laws' focus on evenhanded treatment; instead,
the ADA imposed obligations on covered entities-such as
employers-to alter their environments in favor of those with
disabilities. These obligations, embodied in Title I's reasonable
accommodations mandate, would prevent archaic and unjustifiable
attitudes from denying persons with disabilities their proper place in
society. The resulting concept of equality is one in which the national
government intervenes to eliminate unreasonable conduct (that is,
unjustifiable decisions caused by social neglect) towards individuals
with disabilities and thereby promotes their participation in society's
institutions.
Congress's motives were not purely altruistic. The ADA's Framers
believed that moving individuals with disabilities from welfare to
work would reduce public expenditures.22 The National Council on
20 "Integrationist" is, I acknowledge, a loaded term. For many scholars in the field, it re-
fers to the Act's overarching goal of ending segregation of person with disabilities. See, e.g.,
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L.
REV. 393, 397 (1991) (arguing that it was Congress's intent that the ADA promote integration);
Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 254-64
(2004) (arguing that participation in society is a major life activity); Jacobus tenBroek, The
Right To Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 843 (1966)
(contending that integration should be the goal of disability policy). An emphasis on integration
certainly comports with a basic tenet of civil rights law that segregation is inherently harmful.
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (racial segregation is inherently
harmful); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999) (unjustified isolation in institutions is a
form of discrimination). See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace,
Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000) (arguing that integration is a foundational goal
of civil rights generally). The disability rights community, however, is no more monolithic than
any other social movement. Scholars have suggested alternate purposes for the ADA, such as
gaining the power to make one's own decisions free from paternalistic restrictions, for example,
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 921, 1010-12 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Welfare Reform]; relief from stigma aris-
ing from an historically excluded status, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 436-45 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordi-
nation]; and creation of positive self-images among persons with disabilities seeking employ-
ment, see DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY
IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003).
21 42 U.S.C. § 12101(8) (2000).
22 See generally Bagenstos, Welfare Reform, supra note 20, at 953-74 (analyzing the ADA
as a welfare reform measure).
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the Handicapped's influential 1986 report, Toward Independence,
noted that federal disability-related programs were costing more than
$60 billion. It suggested that a comprehensive civil rights law that
lowered structural and attitudinal employment barriers would reduce
these costs. 23 The cost savings theme is reiterated throughout the leg-
islative history of the ADA.24
Reactions to the passage of the ADA were jubilant. Sensing that a
critical step was taking place in the evolution of civil rights and soci-
25ety generally, proponents were quick to describe the ADA through
historical allusions. At the signing ceremony, President George H.
Bush said: "As the Declaration of Independence has been a beacon
for people all over the world seeking freedom, it is my hope that the
Americans with Disabilities Act will likewise come to be a model for
the choices and opportunities of future generations around the
world. 2 6 Individual legislators also voiced optimistic sentiments. As
in most political moments, there were invocations of the American
Dream2 7 but also more pointed predictions that the ADA would es-
tablish dignity, independence, and inclusion in American society.
NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF
FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABrLrrTIES-WITH LEGISLATIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (1986); see also U.S. COMM'N OF CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING
THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 81 (1983) (concluding that integration of persons with
disabilities into society will reduce public costs of dependency).
24 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43 (1990) (H. Labor and Education Comm.)
(noting that disability discrimination increases public expenditures); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 16
(1989) (S. Labor and Human Resources Comm.) (same); 135 CONG. REC. 14, 19804 (1989)
(statement of Sen. Harkin) (stating that the ADA will reduce public costs of dependency by,
inter alia, putting people to work). See generally Bagenstos, Welfare Reform, supra note 20, at
953-74 (collecting sources).
25 See, e.g., Dick Thomburgh, The Americans with Disabilities Act: What it Means to All
Americans, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 375 (1991) ("The ADA is ... a reawakening. Do not let this
bright moment in modem American history escape you.").
26 Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 933, 26 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES.
DOCs. 1165, 1166 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601,602.
27 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (stating that the ADA demonstrates that
America is dedicated to equality, which is the full measure of the American dream); idL at 96
(additional views of Sen. Hatch) (stating that persons with disabilities should have an "equal
opportunity to participate in the American dream"); 136 CONG. REC. 12, 17365 (1990) (state-
ment of Sen. McCain) ("[The ADA] is an important step in making the American dream avail-
able to all."); 135 CONG. REC. 14, 19800 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("The American
dream is the dream of opportunity for all.... When we free the talents and the abilities of mil-
lions of Americans with disabilities, we all win."). See generally Ann Hubbard, Meaningful
Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997, 1041 n.274 (2004) (citing additional
references to the American Dream in the legislative history of the ADA).
28 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 12, 17370 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (stating that the
purpose of the ADA is to treat people "fairly and decently"); id at 17033 (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (noting that the ADA will provide individuals with disabilities "the fundamental rights to
equal opportunity"); id. at 17031 (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (stating that the ADA recog-
nizes that people with disabilities deserve to be treated with dignity and respect). See generally
Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willbom, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabili-
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Judging from the nearly unanimous votes in the House and Senate,29
few legislators seemed to entertain doubts that the ADA would bring
millions of disabled citizens into the mainstream of American society.
When the cheering stopped, it was clear that Title I of the ADA
had failed to open up the labor market to persons with disabilities.
Although there is some dispute over the causes, everyone now agrees
that the ADA has made no headway in increasing employment levels
among persons with disabilities.3 ° Statistics documenting the decline
in employment are well cataloged elsewhere, so I will limit myself
here to a typical example. The most recent snapshot of the employ-
ment status of individuals with disabilities is the 2004 National Or-
ganization on Disability/Harris Survey of Americans with Disabili-
ties. It indicates an overall employment rate of 35 percent for indi-
viduals with disabilities compared to 78 percent for those without
disabilities.31 This is a lenient measure, since the survey includes both
full- and part-time employment statistics. There is some variation
according to severity of disability. Persons reporting "slight or mod-
erate disabilities" had a 54 percent employment rate compared with
only a 21 2percent rate for those with "very or somewhat severe dis-
abilities."3 Notably, the Harris Poll reflected little change in the em-
ployment prospects of persons with disabilities over time. Although
the 35 percent figure represented an increase from prior surveys in
2000 (32 percent) and 1998 (29 percent), there is little movement
from the 34 percent rate in the original 1986 survey.33
ties, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.14 (2003) (arguing that the promotion of dignity
was an important part of the legislative debate).
29 The ADA passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 355-58, 136 CONG. REC.
12, 17280 (1990), and the Senate by 91-6, id. at 17376.
30 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment
for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 528 (2004) [hereinafter
Bagenstos, Has the ADA Reduced Employment?] ("[N]o knowledgeable observer disputes [that]
the ADA has failed significantly to improve the employment position of people with disabili-
ties.").
3' National Organization on Disability, Key Indicators from the 2004 N.O.D./Harris
Survey of Americans with Disabilities, http://www.nod.org/Resources/harris2004/harris2004-
summ.doc (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
32 Id.
33 Id.; see also, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser, Andrew J. Houtenville & David C. Witten-
burg, A User's Guide to Current Statistics on the Employment of People with Disabilities, in
THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DisAtmrrEs: A POLICY PUZZLE 23, 72 (David
C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) [hereinafter DECLINE] (summarizing Na-
tional Institute of Health statistics indicating a decline in employment among men with disabili-
ties measured by work limitation standard from 50.4 percent (1990) to 44.4 percent (1996)); id.
(summarizing Current Population Survey data indicating a decline in employment among men
with disabilities measured by work limitation standard from 42.1 percent (1990) to 33.1 percent
(2000)). See generally id. at 70-84 (providing statistics on employment rates for individuals with
disabilities for the years 1980-2000 from a variety of sources).
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So what happened? As I discuss in Part m.C of this Article, em-
ployer desires to avoid accommodation costs under Title I are the best
immediate explanation for the decline in employment among persons
with disabilities. The ultimate cause lies in the means provided by
Title I for enforcement. Title I has been rendered ineffective because
of reliance on traditional civil rights mechanisms. My thesis is that
the integrationist goals of Title I are so different from those of tradi-
tional civil rights statutes that it was a mistake to use the latter's con-
cepts and mechanisms in the disability setting. To put the matter
glibly, Title I has fallen into the equality trap.
The paradigmatic civil rights statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights
34Act, rests on the assumption that immutable characteristics such as
race, gender, or national origin are irrelevant to valid workplace deci-
sions; consideration of such traits is therefore irrational, whether or
not tainted with hostile attitudes.35 With regard to the inalterable traits
addressed by Title VII, we are all equal in the sense that membership
in a particular group, ideally, should bear no adverse consequences.
Disparate treatment claims under Title VII seek to secure our equality
interest in being free from racial or gender biases or stereotypes by
promoting even-handed treatment. 36 Disparate impact claims, which
attempt to eliminate neutral workplace practices with an unjustifiably
greater impact on protected classes, are a partial exception to Title
VII's view that immutable traits are irrelevant.37
The ADA's great innovation is the adoption of an active,
integrationist plan in a civil rights context. By traditional standards it
is hardly a theory of equality at all. While Title I of the ADA forbids
consideration of irrelevant disabilities,38 its principal tool is the
reasonable accommodation requirement. 39  The command that
employers alter working environments in favor of persons with
disabilities, recognizes that the defining characteristic of the protected
class is relevant to the statutory goals. Beneficiaries of the statute can
be deemed equal only in an arcane sense, as proposed by the social
model of disability, that their exclusion from society has been caused
artificially by third-party attitudes.40 To be effective, moreover, the
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
35 See infra Part II.A. L.a (discussing irrelevance of defining traits in traditional civil rights
theories).
36 See infra Part Il.A (discussing disparate treatment claims).
37 See infra Part ll.B (discussing disparate impact claims).
38 See infra Part Il.A.2 (discussing disparate treatment claims under Title I).
39 See infra Part 1.C (discussing the reasonable accommodation mandate under Title 1).
40 See, e.g., Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (F)or [sic] Justice
for People with Disabilities, HYPATIA, Winter 1995, at 48 (arguing that society would be differ-
ent if persons with disabilities were the dominant group and, accordingly, disability is a conse-
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accommodation mandate must abandon the traditional focus on
improper group-directed intentions and concentrate instead on the
objective reasonableness of the employer's conduct in denying an
individualized benefit to a particular worker. In my view, carryover
provisions from the Title VII model that focus on the employer's state
of mind interfere significantly with Title I's ability to meet its
integrationist goals.
I elaborate this thesis as follows. Part II of this Article analyzes the
three concepts of equality found in Title I of the ADA. Two of these
concepts, disparate treatment and disparate impact, are borrowed di-
rectly from the Civil Rights Act's Title VII. The former forbids per-
sonnel actions that are based on active consideration of disability
when the disability is irrelevant to job performance. Similar to Title
VII, disparate impact under Title I of the ADA prohibits work rules
and qualification standards having an exclusionary effect on persons
with disabilities that cannot be justified on legitimate business
grounds. The accommodations mandate completes the equality trilogy
but bears little-if any-relationship to the Title VII rule structure.
Title I requires that employers make "reasonable accommodations,"
that is, alterations of work rules or conditions, in favor of individual
workers that permit them to perform their jobs.41 Given the ADA's
focus on achieving integration through positive workplace outcomes,
its desire to alter indifferent attitudes towards persons with disabili-
ties, and the fact that manifestations of disability vary among indi-
viduals, it is difficult to see how the Act could achieve its integration-
ist goals without an accommodations rule. Workplace adjustments,
nevertheless, are conceptually distinct from both disparate treatment
and impact rules since they require individualized redistributions of
employer resources or privilege based on status.
In Part III of this Article, I address the question of compatibility of
concepts. An optimist would argue that the accommodations mandate
serves a supplementary function, creating enhanced opportunities for
workers with disabilities when traditional disparate treatment and
impact analysis fail to make a difference. I do not share this view.
Rather, I perceive that certain fundamental assumptions of the dispa-
quence of social status rather than natural inferiority); see also Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination
Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SC. & L.
41, 53-54 (1996) (arguing that the environment for persons with disabilities is constructed by
public policy that is affected by negative attitudes toward the disabled). See generally Crossley,
Reasonable Accommodations, supra note 8, at 878-80 (explaining the "minority gap model of
disability").
41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2000).
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rate treatment model are so deeply embedded in the structure of the
ADA that they interfere with the integrationist agenda represented by
the accommodations mandate. Specifically, that the Act's definition
of disability (Part H.A) and its procedural approach to hiring deci-
sions (Part m.B) give controlling influence to the disparate treatment
model's view that defining traits are irrelevant and should be filtered
out of the personnel process. The ironic effect is to exclude persons
from the workplace who might benefit from accommodations once
hired. Similarly, I argue in Part II.C that an overly idealistic and
moralistic view of accommodation costs has left Title I without an
effective mechanism to gauge the consequences of costs of employ-
ment. I offer concluding remarks in Part IV.
H1. MODELS OF EQUALITY WITHIN TITLE I
To say that the ADA is a civil rights statute may seem a waste of
breath. Civil rights terminology pervades the statute. The "Findings
and Purposes" section of the Act42 invokes Justice Stone's famous
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products. Co. 4 3 by identifying
persons with disabilities as a "discrete and insular minority."" It re-
fers to the historical tendency to "segregate ' 45 such persons and uses
the term "discrimination" or a variant eleven times. Employment pro-
visions in Title I similarly forbid "discrimination" on the basis of dis-
ability46 and adopt the enforcement mechanisms of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.47 The latter forbids discrimination on the
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."4 Both the text
of the ADA49 and its legislative history5° indicate that Congress
42 Id. § 12101(a)-(b).
43 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (positing that heightened scrutiny may apply in equal pro-
tection claims when classifications affect discrete and insular minorities).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
45 Id. § 12101(a)(2).
46 Id. § 12112 ("No [employer] shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability ... ").
47 Id. § 12117(a).
48 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
49 See, e.g., id. § 12101 (a)(4) ("[U]nlike individuals who have experienced discrimination
on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experi-
enced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination.").
50 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. 12, 17366 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("[H]istory is
going to show that in 1990, 26 years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 million Americans
with disabilities, gained freedom, dignity and opportunity-their civil rights."); id. at 17371
(statement of Sen. Simon) (stating that the ADA represents a 'declaration of independence' for
the citizens with disabilities of this Nation"); id. at 17370 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)
(stating that the ADA guarantees that "the great civil rights advances of this century no longer
exclude Americans with disabilities"). See generally Craig S. Lemer, "Accommodations" for
[Vol. 56:1
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viewed disability discrimination as the moral equivalent of discrimi-
nation against groups traditionally protected by the civil rights laws,
such as Title VII.
As suggested in the Introduction, Title I embodies an integrationist
approach inspired by the social model of disability. Yet its vocabu-
lary, structure, and provisions also reflect the traditional approaches
to equality embodied by Title VII. Once we pass through the optimis-
tic and uplifting language of the Act's preamble, we quickly discover
that Title I amounts to three different statutes. For some applications,
Title I follows the "disparate treatment" model of Title VII. Disparate
treatment assumes that discrimination is the product of the majority's
unjustified attitude towards a minority group.51 In the employment
context, the disparate treatment model posits that race, gender, and
other immutable characteristics are irrelevant to proper decisions in
the workplace and elsewhere.52 Achieving equality, consequently, is a
matter of designing systems that detect unjustified reliance of forbid-
den criteria and offer corrective remedies in individual cases.
A second, distinct approach within Title I centers on the effects of
workplace policies rather than the attitudinal failings of employers.
"Disparate impact" analysis (sometime referred to as "adverse im-
pact") was also imported from Title V1 53 and seeks to disallow em-
ployer practices that have the effect, intent notwithstanding, of de-
priving members of protected classes of employment or benefits.
54
Employers are required to demonstrate "business necessity" for work
rules and standards with an exclusionary effect. Disparate impact
rules are a modest form of affirmative action by which work rules are
subject to change in favor of certain classes of workers. Unlike dispa-
rate treatment, which is oriented towards protecting individuals from
unacceptable employer attitudes, the disparate impact model views
equality as a matter of removing innocent structural barriers to group
participation in the workplace.
Finally, Title I contains provisions requiring that employers
provide accommodations to individual workers that permit them to
perform their essential job functions.55 Other than a now toothless
the Learning Disabled: A Level Playing Field or Affirnative Action for Elites?, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1043, 1049-55 (2004) (discussing, inter alia, civil rights elements in the ADA).
51 See discussion infra Part II.A.
52 See discussion infra Part I.A. L.a.
53 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII "pro-
scribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation").
54 See discussion infra Part H.B.
55 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (2000); see discussion infra Part II.C.
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requirement that employers accommodate their workers' religious
practices,56  the reasonable accommodation mandate has no
antecedents in Title VII or any other civil rights laws. Title VII's
disparate treatment model reflects an "antidifferentiation principle,"
that is, a philosophy that employers should not be permitted to draw
distinctions based on immutable characteristics.57 Disparate impact
strays somewhat from antidifferentiation principles by considering
racial and other identities when judging whether an innocent practice
has an exclusionary effect.58 The burdens on employers, however, are
relatively modest. They may defend by showing business necessity
and at worst must devise new, uniform rules or policies with no or
less tendency to exclude.
Title I's reasonable accommodation mandate, however, takes the
process several strides forward. The law confers a right to individual
benefits under certain circumstances based on the employee's status.
In other words, the accommodation requirement reverses the original
presumption that an immutable characteristic is irrelevant to the em-
ployment relationship. Equality of opportunity (and, in some cases, of
result) replaces antidifferentiation as the guiding light. Accommoda-
tion rules are the lynchpin of Title I' s integrationist agenda. They give
effect to the social model's concept of equality by removing subtle
attitudinal barriers toward the participation of workers with disabili-
ties in the job market.
In this Part, I will elaborate on the three models of equality found
in Title I. Viewed in isolation, the three components of Title I seem to
work tolerably well. Mechanisms borrowed from Title VII have
placed employers under a significant burden of justification when a
plaintiff's disability is genuinely irrelevant to job performance or
when work rules have an exclusionary effect. Accommodation re-
quirements likewise seem to give workers with disabilities an advan-
tage in competing for and holding jobs. But nothing occurs in isola-
tion. The use of competing models of equality in the Act has deprived
Title I of cohesion and consequently interfered with its overarching
goal of improving the employment prospects of persons with disabili-
ties. I will hold that criticism, however, until Part III.
56 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977) (limiting accommo-
dation of workers' religious practices to de minimis burdens).
57 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005-06 (1986) (describing antidifferentiation model).
58 See id. at 1019-20 ("The statutory method of proof... does not require proof of indi-
vidualized motivation and permits consideration of the group-based effects of an action.").
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A. Disparate Treatment
1. In General
Disparate treatment analysis is grounded on the view that reliance
on immutable characteristics, such as race and gender, is inappropri-
ate. This idea has three substrata that emerge from the Title VII cases.
First, decisions based on immutable traits are normally irrelevant to
proper decision making in the work place. Second, judging individu-
als by race or other group traits is unfair since it prevents individuals
from being judged on their own merit. This concept of discrimination,
moreover, is not limited to outright hostility but also forbids more
benign behaviors, such as reliance on stereotypes. Third, the civil
rights model works against the stigmatic effects of discrimination.
Thus, the disparate treatment model also forbids actions by employers
and others that communicate a lesser sense of worth to persons in
protected classifications, even if doing so is economically rational.
a. Irrelevance of Defining Characteristics
A conclusion that race is an irrelevant employment criterion seems
obvious and requires limited commentary. Aside from cases of nepo-
tism, patronage, and other forms of favoritism, success at work is a
matter of bringing qualities, such as skill, personality, education, or
diligence, to bear on a task. Race normally has nothing to do with the
ability of an individual to perform a job. Title VII takes for granted
that immutable characteristics are irrelevant in the labor market.59
Chief Justice Burger stated in the early Griggs v. Duke Power Co.60
decision that Congress intended that Title VII would focus employ-
ers' attention on actual job classifications "so that race, religion, na-
tionality, and sex become irrelevant.",61 Two decades later, in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,62 Justice Brennan extended this philosophy to
gender discrimination by arguing that Title VII's rule against dis-
crimination "because of. . . sex"63 indicates that "gender must be
59 See generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidis-
crimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (2000) (discussing the traditional view that Title V11
aims to discourage reliance on irrelevant immutable characteristics).
60 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61 Id. at 436; see also L.A. Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978) (holding that Title VII intended to make race irrelevant). There is more than a little irony
in the fact that Griggs was a disparate impact case in which the racial identity of the plaintiffs
was critical. See infra Part H.B (discussing Griggs and disparate impact theory).
62 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
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irrelevant to employment decisions." 64 Both opinions are consistent
with commentary on constitutional Equal Protection Clause decisions
that race 65 and gender66 rarely offer a justification for differential
treatment by state actors.
Title VII's single acknowledgment that immutable characteristics
may be relevant is narrow. The BFOQ (bona fide occupational quali-
fication) defense67 permits employment decisions based on gender
and national origin where "reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise.,,68 Race is noticeably
absent from the BFOQ defense, creating the impression that race can
never be a proper basis for personnel decisions.69 Even for gender
classifications, the BFOQ has been applied conservatively. Defen-
dants must show that eliminating the proposed criteria threatens the
viability of the employer's operations7° or destroys the "essence of the
business operation.",71 Few exclusions meet this test.
64 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
65 See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[W]hen
a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin [such] factors are so seldom relevant to
the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy .. "); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)
("Because the Fourteenth Amendment 'protect[s] persons, not groups,' all 'governmental action
based on race-a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited-should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry... ' (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995))).
66 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 ("'[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsus-
pect statuses as intelligence or physical disability ... is that the sex characteristic frequently
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."' (quoting Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973))); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting
that inherent differences between men and women should not be used to impose "artificial
constraints" on an individual opportunity).
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l). See generally Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the
Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right To Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 275, 285-87 (1994) (discussing Title VII BFOQ requirements).
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l). Title VII also creates a BFOQ defense for religious em-
ployment criteria. Id. Religion is the one mutable trait covered by Title VII and as such does not
fit well within the civil rights model's focus on immutable characteristics. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Title VII does not protect mutable
characteristics except religion). I have argued elsewhere that it is more sensible to assign Title
VH's rule against religious discrimination to a First Amendment paradigm rather than an equal
rights model. See James Leonard, Bilingualism and Equality: Title VII Claims for Language
Discrimination in the Workplace, 38 U. MiCti. J.L. REFORM 57, 95-97 (2004) [hereinafter Leo-
nard, Bilingualism].
m See generally Leonard, Bilingualism, supra note 68, at 88 ("The defense is conspicu-
ously not available in cases of race discrimination .... ).
70 Compare, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-37 (1977) (upholding gender
restrictions on hiring of women as prison guards as necessary), with UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202-04 (1991) (holding that an employer rule barring fertile women from
jobs with risk of exposure to lead violates Title VII).
71 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
388 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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b. Rejection of Stereotyping
Employment decisions based on stereotypes may be more benign
than those based on direct animosity. It seems less reprehensible to
deny women jobs because of misplaced concerns for safety or the
female role rather than raw misogyny. The harm done by stereotyping
is nonetheless significant. Stereotypes based on immutable character-
istics substitute group-based judgments for individual assessments of
merit. They are particularly unfair since the immutability of the defin-
ing characteristic leaves individuals unable to escape a class-wide
attribution. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins72 provides the civil rights
model's archetypal rejection of stereotyping under Title VII. Ann
Hopkins had been passed over for partnership at a prestigious ac-
counting firm, in part, because certain partners regarded her suppos-
edly abrasive personality and behaviors as too masculine.73 Justice
Brennan's opinion rejected gender stereotyping as unfair since "we
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group., 74 Title VIl's disapproval of stereotyping comports with
the longstanding rejection of stereotyping in the Court's equal protec-
tion decisions.
75
c. Protection of Dignitary Interests
Finally, there is the difficult situation when employers or others
rely on immutable characteristics without personal animus. The term
"rational discrimination, 76 is sometimes used to describe this phe-
nomenon. According to this concept, managers may be motivated to
draw distinctions on the basis of group membership to maximize
profits or minimize costs. A homogeneous workforce, for example,
72 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also L.A. Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 (1978) (holding that employment decisions may not reflect stereotyped impressions
about the characteristics of males or females).
73 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
74 Id. at 251.
75 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (holding that racially conscious
redistricting presumes that members of a favored group think and act alike); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 650 (1993) (holding that racial gerrymandering of election districts reinforces racial
stereotypes about voting behaviors); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630
(1991) (holding that racially motivated peremptory challenges reflect stereotyped belief that
members of a group cannot assess evidence dispassionately); Orr v. Off, 440 U.S. 268, 278
(1979) (holding that state law limiting alimony to women improperly based on belief that
women occupy a subservient role).
76 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59-78 (1992) (discussing rational discrimination in
competitive markets).
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may simplify internal governance of a firm.77 Search costs for hiring
decisions may be so high that reliance on proxies becomes economi-
cally sensible. 78 The trade-off for such rational behavior is the risk
that persons in protected categories may feel degraded by the use of
explicit or even de facto categories. The civil rights model views the
trade-off as unacceptable.
In a classic article from the early seventies, Professor Paul Brest
argued that the harm of bias often lies in the communication of a mes-
sage of "differential worth., 7 9 He noted that it would not be strictly
irrational to disfavor workers from one racial group if they collec-
tively showed a greater tendency for absenteeism; the Japanese in-
ternments during World War II, he further argued, had some justifica-
tion as a way of preventing sabotage.8° We can update these examples
by noting that scrutiny of travelers from Middle Eastern countries at
international airports bears some relationship-however imprecise-
to the goal of preventing terrorist attacks. Even if the previous exam-
ples are deemed rational, however, we have to concede that such de-
cisions may have the effect of stigmatizing members of certain
classes.8 '
Brest's concerns for the stigmatizing effects of differential treat-
ment had already been acknowledged in the Court's development of
equal protection principles. In West Virginia v. Strauder, 82 decided in
1880, the Court struck down a state law excluding African-Americans
from jury service. Justice Strong's opinion emphasized that the Equal
Protection Clause was intended to confer an "exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society." 83 Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education84 carried this theme
forward into what may have been the Court's most important decision
of the twentieth century. Regarding school segregation, he said, "To
separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
77 Id. at 60-69; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINA-
TION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 24 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973) (arguing that race
and sex are "cheap sources of information" for distinguishing groups of workers).
78 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 70-71 (describing practice of hiring unskilled la-
borers though Hispanic organizations because of cheaper costs and reliable workers).
79 Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimi-
nation Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976); cf Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employ-
ment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 259-60 (197 1) (arguing assertions of rational discrimination
are often a pretext for animus).
80 Brest, supra note 79, at 7.
81 See id. at 8 (discussing the "harms which may result from race-dependent decisions").
82 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
83 Id. at 308.
'4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone. 85 Justice White's opinion in the
more recent decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 6
took for granted that the classification by immutable traits conveys a
message that "those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserv-
ing as others.,
87
Title VII, as construed by the courts, likewise seeks to defend per-
sons in protected classes from stigmatizing messages of inferiority.
The principal manifestation of this goal is Title VII's refusal to rec-
ognize a business necessity defense to facial classifications based on
immutable traits. Employers, for example, may be tempted to erect
differential compensation systems for various categories of workers
motivated solely by cost concerns and without a trace of actual bias.
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,88
an employer had set up an actuarially reasonable pension system un-
der which female employers made higher contributions because of
greater average longevity. 89 The Court rejected the employer's argu-
ment that cost differences in providing benefits for men and women
removed the practice from the ambit of gender discrimination. 90 In
UAW v. Johnson Controls, 91 the Court reiterated its unwillingness to
create a cost defense to Title VII by holding that the possibility of
increased tort liability for exposure to lead did not justify the exclu-
sion of women of fertile age from employment. Employers are cer-
tainly barred from disfavoring members of certain groups even
though it might be more cost effective to cater to the prejudicial tastes
of coworkers or customers.92 The practice of disallowing rational dis-
crimination has its detractors,93 but the Civil Rights Act of 1991 re-
85 Id. at 494.
86 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
87 Id. at 440.
88 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
'9 id. at 704.
90 Id. at 712-17.
91 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991).
92 See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The exis-
tence of such third party preferences for discrimination does not ... justify discriminatory hiring
practices." (internal citation omitted)); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388
(5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting BFOQ defense that customers preferred female flight attendants). See
generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, "Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 851-52 (2003) (discussing courts' rejection of
discrimination based on third party preferences).
93 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 59-78 (arguing for rational discrimination in em-
ployment); cf. Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001)
[hereinafter Kelman, Market Discrimination] (arguing that antidiscrimination principles should
coincide with capitalist-rationale behavior but criticizing accommodations as inefficient).
2005]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
solved any question about the lack of a business necessity defense for
intentional discrimination under Title VII. 94
d. Enforcement
Enforcing a disparate treatment claim is a matter of demonstrating
that the defendant was motivated by the plaintiff s defining character-
istic. Title VII is triggered whenever an employer acts "because of'
such immutable traits as race or gender. Given the breadth of attitudes
targeted by Title VII's disparate treatment provisions, ranging from
outright hatred to rational discrimination, it would be counterproduc-
tive to require evidence of a specific state of mind on the part of the
employer. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Johnson Controls explicitly
dispensed with any requirement that employers act with a malevolent
motive or any particular state of mind.95 Title VII furthermore recog-
nizes liability in mixed motive cases as well, that is, when "the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice. 96 This ample inter-
pretation of forbidden conduct gives Title VII enough flex to police
the employment process for defective criteria and to screen out per-
fectly rational categorizations that carry implicit messages of lesser
worth.
Even though motivation may be easier to demonstrate than a spe-
cific form of discriminatory intent, proving that a defendant acted
"because of' the plaintiffs status will often be difficult.97 Plaintiffs
may of course offer direct evidence of discriminatory intentions.
Sometimes an employer will use racial slurs or make other statements
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2000) ("A demonstration that an employment practice
is requiied by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional
discrimination under [Title VII]."); cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 181 (arguing that Congress
would have accepted costs imposed by Title VU even if they were made explicit in legislative
debates).
95 499 U.S. at 199 ("[Tlhe absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially dis-
criminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether an employment
practice involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on
why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination."); see also
L.A. Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (holding that even true
generalizations about a class of persons cannot justify discrimination).
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). Employers may raise the limited affirmative defense in
a mixed motive case that they would have reached the same result in the absence of the imper-
missible motivating factor. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The defense does not absolve the defendant
of liability, but restricts available remedies to declaratory relief, certain types of injunctive
relief, attorney's fees, and costs. Id.
97 Cf. 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
10-11 (3d ed. 1996) (arguing that the central issue in a Title V1I case is the employer's motiva-
tion).
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that indicate that a forbidden consideration has affected a personnel
decision. Employers will occasionally adopt a workplace policy that
explicitly treats members of protected groups differently. These situa-
tions, however, are rare. Well-counseled managers are polite and
smart enough not to use language or to leave records that indicate bias
or reliance on prohibited factors. 98 Disparate treatment analysis there-
fore permits plaintiffs to skirt the lack of direct evidence by raising an
inference of discrimination when workers of apparently equal qualifi-
cations or status are treated differently.
Inferences of discriminatory intent under Title VII are established
through the well-known McDonnell Douglas framework.99 McDon-
nell Douglas establishes a prima faci'e case of discrimination when
the plaintiff offers evidence that he or she had similar qualifications to
others in the workplace but was treated differently.' ° The test is con-
text sensitive. In a failure-to-hire case, for example, the plaintiff
might allege that: (1) he belonged to a protected class of persons (for
example, a racial group); (2) he had the qualifications for the sought-
after job; (3) he was denied employment; but (4) the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants.1t ' A
plaintiff might establish a prima facie case of discriminatory dis-
charge by alleging that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2)
she was qualified for the job held; (3) she was discharged; and (4) the
position remained open and was ultimately filled by a member out-
side of plaintiff's group.102 In either case, employers must then articu-
late a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions to avoid
summary judgment.10 3 Once employers meet their burden of produc-
tion, the prima facie case loses its significance as the issue of dis-
crimination is submitted to trial where the plaintiff carries the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion that discrimination has occurred. °4
Permitting plaintiffs to proceed by inference opens many claims
that would die for lack of direct evidence. The McDonnell Douglas
98 1 Lax K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.01[l], at 8-7 (2d ed. 1994)
("Employers are... too sophisticated to profess their prejudices on paper or before witnesses.");
see also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716 (1983) ("There will seldom
be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes.").
99 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
100 Id.
'01 Id. at 802; see also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6
(1981) (reaffirming the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test).
l02See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (noting that the re-
spondent: (1) was black, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) was demoted from that position,
and (4) that the position was ultimately filled by a white man); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
103 E.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
104E.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
716 (1983).
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framework allows plaintiffs to dismiss the two most common nondis-
criminatory reasons for employer behaviors, that is, insufficient em-
ployee qualifications for the job in question or lack of a job va-
cancy. 05 Justice Powell, for example, opined that "the prima facie
case 'raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors."' 1°6 Stated somewhat dif-
ferently, the prima facie case creates a simple behavioral model in
which the presence of an immutable trait is the only variable available
to explain the result. At this point, the employer's motivations be-
come sufficiently suspect to require a justification that points to a
legitimate variable.
Equally important, McDonnell Douglas operationalizes the as-
sumptions of the disparate treatment model. The model posits that
consideration of inalterable characteristics for nearly all purposes is
either irrelevant or unfair to individuals. Once the circumstances of a
personnel transaction suggest reliance on race, gender, and so forth, it
is fair to assume that an employer's decision has been infected by
extraneous factors or by stereotyped thoughts. To the extent that a
defendant can offer a sensible, nondiscriminatory explanation for his
or her actions, however, the likelihood of tainted motivations dimin-
ishes. To be sure, the defendant's articulation of a legitimate purpose
does not end the inquiry; the plaintiff must respond with evidence that
the defendant's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. 10 7 Never-
theless, the suggestion of a legitimate purpose creates considerable
doubt about the intrusion of irrelevancies and stereotypes into the
workplace. Hence, we now impose on the plaintiff, as we do in the
typical civil case, the burden of persuading a court that the em-
ployer's proffered explanations are a pretext or that discrimination
has otherwise occurred.
Plaintiffs attempting to vindicate dignitary interests against em-
ployer policies that draw facial distinctions (rational or otherwise) on
the basis of immutable traits face fewer evidentiary challenges. Here,
McDonnell Douglas does not apply because there is no need to infer
discriminatory intent.10 8 The policy itself provides direct evidence of
discrimination. In Manhart, for example, there was no question that
105 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
106 Id. (quoting Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
1w See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000) (holding
that the plaintiff must respond with proof of pretext and prevail on ultimate question of dis-
crimination).
108 See 1 L1NDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 97, at 39-40 (noting that a plaintiff does
not use the McDonnell Douglas framework when she produces direct evidence).
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the employer's pension plan called for high premiums for female em-
ployers. 09 Similarly, the work restrictions in Johnson Controls ap-
plied specifically to women of fertile age." 10
2. Disparate Treatment in Title I of the ADA
Title I includes a general disparate treatment rule, that is, a restric-
tion on the active consideration of disability status in personnel trans-
actions. Although section 102(a)'s broadly worded, general prohibi-
tion against discrimination "because of' disability"' implicitly in-
cludes disparate treatment," 2 Congress elected to give more specific
guidance in section 102(b)(1). The latter provision prohibits "limiting,
segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that
adversely affects [his or her] opportunities or status.""' 3 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) takes a broad view
that section 102(b)(1) is intended to prevent employers from acting on
the basis of myths or stereotypes about the effects of disabilities in-
stead of making individualized assessments. The EEOC's commen-
tary to Title I regulations states that the rule is intended to forbid pa-
tronizing decisions based on "what is best for an individual with such
a disability"'" 4 or within his or her presumed capabilities." 5 In addi-
tion, the prohibition against discrimination based on a worker's
known association with an individual with a disability" 16 is best clas-
sified as a form of a disparate treatment rule, as are claims of a hostile
work environment. " 1
7
There are unavoidable differences in the reach of disparate treat-
ment claims under the ADA and Title VII. Disability is sometimes a
relevant and proper point of decision in personnel matters since many
jobs have legitimate physical or mental requirements. We require that
surgical nurses be able to hear instructions from surgeons wearing
masks for a good reason.18 It is therefore impossible to extend,
1°9 L.A. Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978).
I"° UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991).
"'142 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
112 See id. § 12101(a)(5) (stating congressional findings that persons with disabilities have
been subject to "outright intentional exclusion" as well as discrimination based on neglect and
indifference).
113 1d. § 12112(b)(1).
1429 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 373 (2004) (commentary to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5).
115.d
11642 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000).
"
7 See Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
hostile environment claim under Title I); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir.
2001) (same).
"'See Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 403, 408 (1979) (recognizing that surgical
nurses must have the ability to hear spoken words).
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wholesale, Title VIl's assumption that race, gender, etc., are irrele-
vant to the treatment of disability under Title I. In contrast to Title
VII's universal application (except in rare cases, everyone has a gen-
der and at least one racial identification), the ADA limits the protec-
tions of Title I to the "qualified individual with a disability."'' 9 To
meet this standard, a person must not only be disabled 20 but must
also be able to perform the essential job functions in question with or
without a reasonable accommodation. 12' While the restricted defini-
tion of a qualified individual with a disability is intended to protect
employers from excessive accommodation costs and operational dis-
ruptions, 122 it also serves to limit Title I's protections to persons
whose abilities are roughly comparable to those of the general popu-
lation.123 Thus, Title I confines itself to instances where accommoda-
tions are either unnecessary or not overly burdensome.
Genuine disparate treatment, that is, personnel decisions based on
an occupationally irrelevant status, occurs only in those Title I cases
where the plaintiff can perform job functions without any accommo-
dations. Requests for accommodation inject the plausible possibility
that an employer's actions are motivated by factors other than the
identity of the worker, for example, costs. In nonaccommodation
cases, however, the assumption that the defining characteristic is ir-
relevant does hold true. Such cases are rare but occasionally occur.
Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc.124 was tried, in part, on the theory that a
woman who had been born without a lower left arm could nonetheless
operate a scanning machine without an accommodation. 25 A CPA
who is paraplegic and has applied for a job in an accounting firm
would also likely meet the "qualified individual with a disability"
standard126 without any accommodations (assuming an accessible
work site). In these situations, the disability is irrelevant to the ability
to perform the job. Once an accommodation is requested, the assump-
tion that disability status is irrelevant necessarily disappears.
Nonaccommodation cases under section 102(b)(1) theoretically
should be governed by the rule in Johnson Controls.127 (I am, how-
11942 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
120 See infra Part III.A (discussing definitional requirements of Title I).
121 See id. (same).
12 2 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26 (1991) ("By including the phrase 'qualified individual
with a disability,' the Committee intends to reaffirm that this legislation does not undermine an
employer's ability to choose and maintain qualified workers.").
123 See infra Part IH.A.
124 256 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2001).
125 Id. at 573-77.
12629 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 368 (2004) (commentary to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).
127 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, The Americans with Disabilities Act,
and Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REv. 923, 938 & n. 119 (2004) [hereinafter Bagenstos,
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ever, unaware of any ADA case discussing the application of this case
to Title I.) To the extent that a disability is irrelevant to a particular
job, it would be unreasonable to require proof of a particular state of
mind, such as animus, to establish discriminatory conduct. Any con-
sideration of disability status in a nonaccommodation context injects a
risk that stereotypes or other improper considerations have tainted an
individual assessment. There is certainly no reason to expect that the
range of improper motivations experienced under Title VH is less
likely to occur under Title I.
Title I should be an effective mechanism for remedying genuine
disparate impact cases. (I say "should" since most claims involve a
request for an accommodation.) Although a plaintiff may luck out and
discover direct evidence of discriminatory intent,128 it is more likely
that she will need to use the McDonnell Douglas test. The Supreme
Court has not yet determined a formula for applying McDonnell
Douglas to ADA cases, and there is variation in the lower courts'
formulae for establishing a prima facie case under Title I. Two
examples should suffice to demonstrate the distinctions. The Sixth
Circuit's decision in Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.129
phrases the test to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that: (1) they are
disabled; (2) they otherwise qualified for the job with or without a
reasonable accommodation; (3) they suffered an adverse employment
decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of the
disability; and (5) the position remained open or the person with a
disability was replaced.130 A simpler variant of the prima facie case is
Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. ,1 1 in which the Third Circuit held
that a plaintiff must establish (1) a disability within the meaning of
the ADA; (2) that he or she is "otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
Supreme Court] (arguing that Title I incorporates Title VII's refusal to provide business neces-
sity defense in disparate treatment claims).
128Hoffman, 256 F.3d at 571 (stating the fact that the manager admitted that the training
opportunity was denied because of plaintiffs disability).
'
29 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996).
30 Id. at 1185. One should note that the prima facie formula in Monette, as well as the one
prescribed in Gaul, see infra note 131, is used for all Title I claims, including reasonable ac-
commodation claims. A discussion of the wisdom of employing a "unified field theory" for Title
I claims is beyond the scope of this essay. See generally Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reason-
able Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks De-
veloped Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought Under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98 (1997) (discussing the
difficulties in using McDonnell Douglas test in the ADA context).
' 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 1998).
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accommodations"; and (3) an "adverse employment decision as a
result of discrimination."' 
32
An in-depth discussion of prima facie proof of ADA employment
claims is beyond the scope of this Article. The precise formulation of
the test should, however, have little effect in genuine disparate treat-
ment claims. Title I plaintiffs who can perform the functions of a job
without accommodations occupy the same position as a race or gen-
der claimant under Title VII. In either case, the defining characteristic
is irrelevant while the occurrence of an adverse employment decision
creates suspicion that an employer's awareness of such traits has con-
tributed to the outcome.
Let us return to the example of the CPA with paraplegia. Assum-
ing that she has not demanded accommodations, a decision to fire her
may prompt suspicions that discrimination is involved. Once there is
evidence that the employer has replaced her with a CPA who is not
disabled or a non-CPA accountant (the permutations are probably
infinite), our suspicions become sufficiently definite to require the
employer to offer some justification. We should arrive at this infer-
ence, moreover, whether the formula calls for an adverse employment
decision stemming from discrimination (the Third Circuit test) or
more specifically for evidence that the job was filled by a person who
was not disabled (the Sixth Circuit test). There is no guarantee that
our plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial: the employer's explana-
tion may prove credible. The particular system of inferential proof
used, however, should not impede a genuine disparate treatment
claim.
Title I is reasonably well adapted to deal with instances of occupa-
tional segregation, broadly defined. The disparate treatment model's
concern for employer practices that convey a message of inferiority
through differential treatment is reflected by section 102(b)(1)'s rule
against separate benefit systems or segregated working conditions.
The EEOC's commentary to regulations implementing this section
conveys particular concern over employer practices that remove per-
sons with disabilities from the general workforce, either literally or
through the offer of inferior benefits. While the EEOC contemplates
that employers may impose restrictions on workers with disabilities if
justified on a "case by case basis,"'133 for example, out of safety con-
cerns, it seems to regard segregation as inappropriate per se. The
EEOC commentary points to separate job tracks, work locations, and
132 Id. at 580.
133 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 373 (2004) (commentary to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5).
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break facilities as examples of forbidden segregation.134 At least one
court has ratified this approach, holding that requiring an employee
with a mental illness to work alone and not speak with others contra-
venes section 102(b)(1).'35
The EEOC's hard-line position against separate work tracks or
benefits finds justification in the ADA's text. Section 102(b)(1) con-
spicuously provides for no defenses. In contrast, defendants may raise
an undue hardship to accommodation requests 136 and a business ne-
cessity defense to disparate impact challenges to qualifications stan-
dards. 137 The lack of a defense is all the more apparent when we note
that the ADA's Title III antisegregation rule, governing public ac-
commodations, permits covered entities to provide separate services if
necessary to confer an equivalent benefit.1 38 The latter strongly im-
plies that Congress did not wish to create any defenses to segregation
claims under Title 1.139 Thus, section 102(b)(1) should be read to em-
body the Manhart rule against differential compensation, benefits, or
working conditions, even when it is economically rational to do so.
Proof of occupational segregation or differential benefits is quite
simple. There is no need to fall back on the McDonnell Douglas
scheme since physical separation or differential terms of a policy will
supply direct evidence of discrimination. 140 To take a rather blatant
example, an employer who provides a separate break room for dis-
abled employees would be in patent violation of section 102(b)(1).141
Assigning a worker with a mental illness to work alone and not speak
to anyone else would likewise trigger the ban on segregation. 42 In
such cases, the plaintiff need only point to the existence of a policy to
marshal direct evidence of discrimination.
134Id.
35 See, e.g., Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 1998); cf. Tyler v. Is-
pat Inland Inc., 245 F.3d 969, 973-94 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the claim for segregation
failed for lack of proof).
13642 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (2000).
1371d. § 12112(6).
138 Id. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(iii) (prohibiting the provision of a separate benefit as discrimina-
tory unless necessary to confer an equal benefit); cf id. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(ii) (prohibiting provi-
sion of an unequal benefit as discriminatory).
139 See Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 127, at 938 & n. 119.
140 See I LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 97, at 39-40.
141 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 373 (2004) (commentary to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5).
142 Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 1998).
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B. Disparate Impact Claims
1. In General
"Disparate impact," sometimes called "adverse impact," provides a
second approach to the nondiscrimination mandate of Title VII.
Unlike disparate treatment claims, disparate impact analysis has noth-
ingto do with employer attitudes; 143 rather, it is concerned with situa-
tions in which unequal results arise from the application of neutral
policies. Disparate impact is, in sum, a rule against neutral workplace
policies with disproportionately negative effects on a protected class
that cannot be justified by business necessity.
Disparate impact claims originated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.'a
There, black employees challenged an employer's educational
regulations that had the effect of denying them entry to the more
desirable job classifications at a power plant.145 In the Court's view,
however, the regulations lacked a relationship to job performance.'
46
Chief Justice Burger's opinion justified the creation of disparate
impact liability in two key phrases: "[A]bsence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability"'147 and "Congress
directed [Title VII towards] the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation."'' 48 Burger's conclusion was, to
say the least, questionable. It is doubtful that Congress, in 1964,
envisioned disparate impact claims for Title VII.149 The matter is now
wholly academic since Congress codified disparate impact claims in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.50 The Court's recent opinion in
1431 have argued elsewhere that disparate impact claims can be rationalized as a clumsy
device for smoking out discriminatory intent. See Leonard, Bilingualism, supra note 68, at 95-
97; see also George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1987) (arguing that disparate impact serves to
prevent pretextual discrimination).
'44401 U.S. 424 (1970).
145 Id. at 427-28.
146 Id. at 433-36.
147 Id. at 432.
1 Id.
'49 See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codifi-
cation of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE. W. RES. L.
REV. 287, 293 (1993) (suggesting that in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress would
have rejected disparate impact claims).
15 See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, su-
pra note 97, at 85 (discussing codification of disparate impact rules).
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Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez'51 characterizes such claims as requiring
no showing of a subjective intent to discriminate.152
Disparate impact analysis takes a structural and group-oriented
view of equality that is somewhat at odds with the disparate treatment
model. The goal of the former theory is to remove barriers, even in-
nocent ones, to promote the participation or advancement of protected
classes of persons in the workplace. It is also fair to say that disparate
impact is a form of affirmative action and not simply an antidiscrimi-
nation device.1 53 "Affirmative action" is a slippery term that, in its
original sense, referred to preferential treatment intended to correct
past discrimination.154 Here, I am using the term in the contemporary
sense of an attempt to confer a benefit on a designated class regard-
less of an employer's actions or attitudes.1 55 There is little doubt that
disparate impact rules meet this criterion as the effect of a successful
claim is to reorder the workplace to the benefit of the group to which
the plaintiff belongs. At the postremedial stage, however, the results
of successful disparate impact and treatment claims resemble each
other in this respect: the workplace will be subject to rules or prac-
tices that apply equally to all workers.
Proof in disparate impact claims is a matter of group-to-group
comparison and is normally done on the strength of statistical evi-
dence.1 56 The archetypal example is height and weight requirements
that tend to disadvantage female job applicants. 157 Once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case that a protected group is disproportion-
ately affected by a practice or policy, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to prove business necessity for that practice. 58 Note, that
the disparate impact defendant, at this point, shoulders a burden of
persuasion that is greater than the disparate treatment defendant's
obligation to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for his or her ac-
tions. 59 Even if the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff may still
"' 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
152 Id. at 52.
153 See, e.g., Browne, supra note 149 (interpreting disparate impact as a form of affirmative
action).
154See Tucker, supra note 8, at 345.
155 See, e.g., Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-12 (1979) (holding that section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not require defendant to undertake affirmative action by alter-
ing program requirements for nursing school applicant).
156 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 97, at 87.
157 E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (noting that height and weight re-
quirements for prison guard position tended to disqualify women applicants).
15842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000). See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World
Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505,
1513-24 (2004) (discussing evolution of disparate impact claims).
159See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
that the requirement that the plaintiff show significant impact in a Title VII disparate impact
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argue the existence of an alternative practice that would meet busi-
ness requirements yet impose a lesser burden on the protected class.'
6 °
2. Disparate Impact Elements of Title I
Three provisions of Title I fall within the disparate impact cate-
gory. Section 102(b)(3) of the Act prohibits using standards, criteria,
or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination.'
16
Similarly, section 102(b)(6) disallows qualification standards, em-
ployment tests, or other selection criteria that do, or tend to, screen
out persons with disabilities.' 62 Finally, section 102(b)(7) forbids the
failure to select or administer tests that accurately measure the tested
skill rather than a sensory or other impairment.
163
At first glance, these rules fit comfortably within the established
Title VII framework for disparate impact claims. Take the example of
Cripe v. City of San Jose.164 Defendant police department had a policy
that, to qualify for a three-year special assignment position (that is, a
desk job), the applicant had to have been a patrol officer for the pre-
ceding year and be able to return to that position afterwards. The
Ninth Circuit had no trouble determining that such a rule tended to
exclude officers with disabilities who could not walk the beat in con-
travention of section 102(b)(6) of the Act. 165 The remaining question
was whether there was a business justification for the qualification
standard. The Court said no, finding, inter alia, insufficient links be-
tween the exclusionary policy and the defendant's contention that the
special assignment policy was necessary to promote readiness for
police duties and officer training.
166
Cripe itself lies squarely within the tradition of Griggs. In both
cases, plaintiffs pointed to neutral policies lacking business justifica-
tion that tended to screen out black workers and police officers with
disabilities, respectively, as a class. The individualized nature of dis-
abilities, however, often strains the resemblance between Title I and
Title VII disparate impact claims. Section 102(b)(6) permits plaintiffs
to demonstrate that qualification standards have a disqualifying effect
claim justifies placing higher evidentiary burden on the defendant than in disparate treatment
analysis).
16042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
16 1 Id. § 12112(b)(3).
162 1d. § 12112(b)(6).
63 Id. § 12112(b)(7).
164261 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001).
'
65 1d. at 895.
166 Id. at 890-91.
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either on a class of persons with a disability or on the individual
plaintiff.167 The reason for individuating adverse impact appears to be
the difficulty in identifying a sufficient number of persons with the
plaintiff's particular disability to permit statistically meaningful group
comparisons.168 (Racial or gender calculations under Title VII are
relatively straightforward.) An individuated Title I disparate impact
claim, moreover, is difficult to distinguish from a reasonable accom-
modation claim. To say that a neutral policy should be changed be-
cause of its effects on a single person strikes me as the equivalent of a
request that the plaintiff be accommodated by a rule waiver.
An additional complication in Title I's disparate impact scheme
lies in the restricted definition of a protected class. Section 102's
disparate impact provision refers to discrimination on the basis of
disability169 against individuals with a disability. 170 Although I can
find no case discussing this matter, I assume that the proper
comparison group for a disparate impact claim would be persons who
not only share the plaintiff's impairment but also meet the demanding
standards for disability.' 7' Since such determinations are
individualized, most plaintiffs will find it impractical to identify a
sufficiently large enough group of legally disabled persons who share
her particular impairment and manifestations to meet the comparative
requirements of a traditional disparate impact claim. If we further
require that the comparison group consist of "qualified individuals
with a disability," the evidentiary burdens would probably make such
a claim impossible. In contrast, Title VII's universality of coverage
makes it relatively easy for a claimant to muster a comparison class.
16742 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); see also Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, 176 F.3d 834,
839 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the plaintiff may establish disparate impact "by demon-
strating an adverse impact on himself rather than on an entire group" (citing 1 LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 97, at 333-34)).
'68 Bagenstos, Has the ADA Reduced Employment?, supra note 30, at 538 ("The wide di-
versity among disabilities makes comparisons between an employer's treatment of people with
different disabilities largely meaningless ...."); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53
STAN. L. REv. 223, 275 (2000) [hereinafter Jolls, Accommodation Mandates]; Steven L. Will-
born, The Nonevolution of Enforcement under the ADA: Discharge Cases and the Hiring Prob-
lem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN
LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 103, 108 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000).
1-'42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (2000) (prohibiting standards that have the effect of dis-
crimination "on the basis of disability").
70 1ld. § 12112(b)(6) (referring to qualification standards affecting "an individual with a
disability"); id. § 121 12(b)(7) (regulating employment tests administered to a "job applicant or
employee who has a disability").
171 Cf Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 168, at 275 (noting that use of a
broader comparison group of all disabled persons would facilitate claims but conceding that
such an approach is not authorized under current law).
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C. Reasonable Accommodations
Reasonable accommodation claims are the principal innovation of
the ADA. For Title I, the statutory command is section 102(b)(5)(A),
which declares discriminatory an employer's failure to grant a rea-
sonable accommodation unless she can demonstrate that compliance
would impose an undue hardship on a business operation.1 72 Title I
does not offer a fixed definition of reasonable accommodation; rather,
it defines reasonable accommodations by example. 173 The goal is that
employers should modify job application processes or the work envi-
ronment to allow an individual with a disability to perform the essen-
tial functions of a job short of an undue hardship.174
Reasonable accommodations are a novelty in civil rights law. With
one exception, they lack antecedents in the Title VII. The latter statute
does require employers to make accommodations for employees'
religious practices. 175 This rule was gutted, however, by the Supreme
Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 176 holding
that employers need not afford accommodations that involve more
than de minimis costs. The legislative history of the ADA, however,
makes explicit that Congress did not intend for Title I to incorporate
the now anemic Hardison standard.
177
Title I's accommodations mandate is different in three respects
from prior civil rights legislation. First, though the reasonable ac-
commodation system shares an indifference to the employer's inten-
tions with the disparate impact model, the focus of the former is ex-
clusively individual. The issue is whether a certain applicant or
worker needs help to do a job rather than the effects of a work policy
on a group. Second, the accommodation mandate requires that em-
ployers treat workers with disabilities differently-perhaps better-
than other employees. Disparate treatment claims, in contrast, are
based on the notion that the plaintiff is like all other employees and is
17242 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
173 Title 1 states that reasonable accommodations include:
making existing facilities.., accessible .... job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition
or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modi-
fications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
Id. § 12111(9).
174 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(i)-(ii) (2004) (defining reasonable accommodations).
17542 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
176432 U.S. 63, 65 (1977).
177 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990) (stating that the Hardison standard does
not apply to the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA).
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therefore entitled to standard job opportunities, compensation, and
benefits, while disparate impact claims seek to fashion uniform rules
with the least disadvantaging effects on protected classes. Finally,
reasonable accommodation rules impose affirmative obligations on
employers to act rather than to refrain from discriminatory actions.
The concept of accommodation is, in fact, radically different from
the concepts of the disparate treatment and disparate impact models.
Disparate treatment reflects what many commentators call "formal
equality," that is, a mandate to treat similarly situated workers the
same without regard to a defining characteristic. 7 8 I find the termi-
nology puzzling since there is nothing "formal," much less insignifi-
cant, about the disparate treatment model's goal of weeding out
tainted distinctions among employees. Still, the observation that so-
called formal equality calls for employers to apply a single set of
rules to all employees and to regard them from a single frame of mind
is undoubtedly correct. While the disparate impact model requires
that we deviate from formal equality long enough to gauge the effects
of policies on particular groups, a successful claim should result in a
uniform work rule with no--or at least fewer-adverse effects. By
requiring that employers confer individualized benefits on disabled
workers, Title I's accommodation requirement drops any pretense of
formal equality's insistence on evenhanded treatment to achieve
merit-based results. Justice Breyer's opinion in US Airways v. Bar-
nett179 acknowledges this rather obvious point by stating that, yes,
indeed, an accommodation "requires the employer to treat an em-
ployee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially."'l 80
Professor Malloy argues that the ADA must rely on an
accommodations system since disabilities, unlike race, are often
178 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devalua-
tion and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747-48 (2001) (stating that the disparate
treatment model prohibits use of different standards for persons in disfavored groups); Lisa
Eichhom, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of The
Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 580-81 (2002) (arguing that Title VII follows
formal equality model requiring application of same standards regardless of race, sex, national
origin, and religion); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 691, 705 (1997) (arguing that formal equality is the dominant theme of antidiscrimina-
tion law); Arlene B. Mayerson & Silvia Yee, The ADA and Models of Equality, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
535, 538 (2001) (noting that the formal equality model attempts to treat like persons alike and
aims for merit based distribution of goods); cf. Tucker, supra note 8, at 343 (noting apparent
conflict between the traditional civil rights concepts and ADA's reasonable accommodation
scheme).
179535 U.S. 391 (2002).
180 1 d. at 397. See generally Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Ac-
commodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951 (2004) (distin-
guishing preferential treatment view of Barnett from affirmative action and arguing that disabil-
ity rights advocated should embrace differential treatment approach).
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legitimate points of decision in personnel matters and tend to be
unique.' 8' As a practical matter she is correct. Disability is an
umbrella concept that covers countless impairments that usually
produce different manifestations or degrees of severity among those
affected. 82 Given the infinite variety of disabilities, only a system of
individualized adjustments in the workplace would have an
appreciable effect on the employment prospects of persons with
disabilities, individually and as a group. The accommodations model
assumes the desirability of deviating from traditional notions of
equality to produce better employment outcomes for individuals with
disabilities. Let me be clear that I am not arguing against this
assumption as a matter of policy. My purpose here is to establish the
remarkable qualitative difference between the accommodationist view
of "equality" and that of disparate treatment and impact.
My characterization of accommodations as lying outside the tradi-
tional realm of equality is at odds with the social conception of dis-
ability that pervades the disability rights movement. As discussed
earlier (Part I), the social model views disability as an artifact of so-
cial conditions. While adherents to this philosophy acknowledge that
impairments exist, 83 they attribute disability status to the interaction
between the physical or mental self and the social structures that
dominate the environment. 184 This approach corresponds to Professor
Minow's well-known "social relations" theory of difference 185 and
can be illustrated for our purposes by a simple example. A person
with paraplegia experiences a natural disadvantage in mobility. The
consequences of her "disability," however, are determined by the
decisions of social institutions. Say she wants to get to an office on
the top floor of a building. She cannot cross the street to get to the
181 S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability
Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REv. 603, 608-09 (2002).
182 See, e.g., Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 20, at 405-06 (noting the difficulty of
establishing a core definition for disability when "[c]ommon understanding of 'disability'
ranges from deafness to quadriplegia, from epilepsy to cancer, from blindness to mental retarda-
tion, from mental illness to heart conditions," all of which may involve different manifestations
occurring at different stages of life).
183 See, e.g., Crossley, Reasonable Accommodations, supra note 8, at 876 n.65 (noting that
advocates of the social model do not deny the biological existence of impairments or the fact of
limitations).
184E.g., id. at 876 (citing, e.g., SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 31 (1996)); Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 20, at 428-32
(discussing the social model's view that disability is an interaction between social barriers and
impairments).
185 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 110-20 (1990) (criticizing the Cleburne majority for taking a rights based view
approach rather than the social relations approach advocated by Justice Marshall's opinion,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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building without curb cuts; she may need a power-assist to open the
front door; there must be an elevator with an accessible doorway and
a control panel within reach; and so forth. The social model would
view her disability as "socially constructed" since alternative choices
would have rendered her impairment irrelevant.186 According to this
school of thought, accommodations are a remedy to restore conditions
of equality that have been lost because of misguided choices. 
187
Social constructions of disability are true in the sense that the hu-
man environment often entails a series of choices that presume "nor-
mal" capacities. This observation holds, moreover, whether a decision
to create an inaccessible environment arises from insensitivity to the
needs of persons with impairments or from reliance on stereotypes
about their capacities or roles in society. Social construction, how-
ever, cannot be a theory of equality in any traditional sense. Although
the social model shares with its predecessors the ultimate goal of
equal status for all persons, it can achieve them only by affirmatively
considering and addressing matters of genuine difference, that is, im-
pairments. Thus, it is extremely difficult to reconcile the accommoda-
tionist agenda of Title I with the traditional civil rights model's as-
sumption that immutable traits are irrelevant to a person's ability to
work or participate in society. 88 It is true that disability, race, and
186Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 20, at 428 (describing social model's refusal to
accept "existing social arrangements as a neutral baseline").
187 Crossley, Reasonable Accommodations, supra note 8, at 877-78 (discussing view that
society is obligated to provide a remedy for social structures that disadvantage persons with
disabilities).
188See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN
REGULATION AND TAXATION 8-9 (1999) (explaining that the ADA is a broad-based redistribu-
tive program intending "to funnel social resources to a class of deserving beneficiaries" as a
result of its requirement that covered entities "provide beneficial, non-market-rational treatment
to certain customers (or workers)"). Professor Kelman regards accommodation requests as
demands for resource distributions and "an 'implicit regulatory tax."' Kelman, Market Dis-
crimination, supra note 93, at 880. Conventional wisdom among academic commentators holds
that the accommodations mandate of the ADA is conceptually different from traditional antidis-
crimination norms. E.g., John J. Donohue I1, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective:
Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2583, 2608-09, 2612 (1994); Pamela S. Karlan &
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1, 1-14 (1996). See generally J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Ac-
commodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1385 n.1 (2003) (collecting sources). Recently
some scholars have attempted to demonstrate equivalence between traditional antidiscrimination
principles and the accommodation mandate. Professor Jolls has observed as a descriptive matter
an overlap between the cost effects of accommodation and disparate impact theories. See Chris-
tine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642, 684-97 (2001).
Professor Bagenstos, in turn, argues that accommodation and antidiscrimination mandates in the
ADA are expressions of an overarching antisubordination norm. Bagenstos, Subordination,
supra note 20, at 453-84; see also, e.g., Crossley, Reasonable Accommodations, supra note 8, at
898-944 (finding conceptual similarities between accommodations and disparate impact and
hostile environment claims but limited affinity with affirmative action theories); Michael Ashley
Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153
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gender discrimination are also "socially constructed" to the extent that
they result from the attitudes of employers or others in power. The
commonality dissolves, however, once we acknowledge the funda-
mental assumption that disability status is frequently relevant while
race and gender are rarely so. While social construction provides a
theoretical justification for Title I' s integrationist goals, as manifest in
the reasonable accommodations mandate, it should not be viewed as
part of the traditional civil rights model.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF EMPLOYING THE CIVIL RIGHTS MODEL
In Part II, I argued that Title I embodies three distinct models of
"equality": traditional equal treatment provisions, a group-oriented
disparate impact scheme, and a system of personalized accommoda-
tions. The next question, is whether this multiplicity of approaches
makes a difference. Could these three visions of equality serve as
complementary means of advancing the interests of persons with dis-
abilities? There are serious issues of compatibility. My observations
of the interactions among the three concepts lead me to conclude that
the traditional disparate treatment view carried over from Title VII
undercuts the integrationist goals of the accommodations mandate. I
see interference most clearly in three areas: (1) Title I's definition of
who is disabled, (2) the procedural nature of Title I's approach to
U. PA. L. REv. 579, 662-69 (2004) (arguing for antisubordination view of accommodations and
that contact between persons with or without disabilities in the workplace is necessary to com-
bat bias). There are points of commonality between the antidiscrimination and accommodation
models. Title Vil's rejection of rational discrimination implicit in the failure to create a cost
defense to disparate treatment claims, see discussion supra Part ILA, is properly taken as an
antisubordination rule. Disparate impact claims can likewise have a dissubordinating effect of
bringing traditionally excluded groups into the workplace, whether we call the practice affirma-
tive action or something else. See discussion supra Part l.B. Finding an essential identity be-
tween antidiscrimination and accommodation models, however, is too facile. Viewed as a
whole, the two concepts serve different goals. Professor Verkerke draws a perceptive distinction
between the "positive equality" aspects of disparate impact claims that he views largely as a
method of forcing meritocratic standards on personnel decisions, Verkerke, supra, at 1398-99,
and the special costs of accommodations that involve expenditures that are unrelated to rational
business conduct, id. at 1400. Antisubordination theory, moreover, does not share the traditional
view that immutable traits are irrelevant. Indeed, antisubordination theories by their nature take
a protective and proactive view of difference. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 20, at
418-45 (explaining that the ADA is designed to undo patterns of social subordination). Finally,
even if antidiscrimination and accommodation rules are aspects of an underlying anti-
subordination norm, Title I's enforcement mechanisms are counterproductive. As argued at
greater length in the preceding subchapters, Title VII and Title I in large part effectuate tradi-
tional antidiscrimination norms through disparate treatment liability and enforcement structures.
It is the ADA's attempt to conform to the antidiscrimination standard of the civil rights model
that has rendered Title I ineffective. See discussion infra Part 1II.
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regulating hiring decisions, and (3) Title I's moralistic approach to the
questions of accommodation costs.
A. Definitions of Disability
Definitions of disability in the ADA serve a gateway function that
has no counterpart in Title VII. Everyone is protected by Title VII
since each person can be assigned to at least one race, gender, 189 or
national origin and has some religious affiliation or lack thereof. Any
notion that Title VII was limited to the protection of minorities was
quashed early on with the Court's decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail. 90 Justice Marshall's opinion concluded that two white workers
who had been discharged for stealing antifreeze from a train could
state a Title VII claim by alleging that a black worker involved in the
same incident had not been similarly discharged. 19' The opinion em-
phasized that the terms of the statute and the legislative history point
to no congressional intention to create a limited protected class.
192
Title I of the ADA, in contrast, abandons Title VII's universal cover-
age and protects only those who have a "disability"1 93 and are fur-
thermore "qualified individual[s] with a disability."'' 94
Disability is defined in the ADA's Preamble in a tripartite fashion.
Most obviously, the Act protects persons with an actual disability,
defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual."'' 95 To use
a simple example, a person with paraplegia would meet this definition
since she has a physical impairment that prevents her from perform-
ing the major life activity of walking.196 Additionally, the Act protects
persons who have a record of disability 97 or are regarded as dis-
abled' 98 by others. An example of either category would be the cancer
survivor who inevitably has extensive medical records from treatment
and is viewed as disabled by coworkers. 199
189 Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (defining "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" un-
der the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to actions taken "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions").
190 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
191 Id. at 279-85.
192 Id. at 279-80.
193 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining a "disability").
'94Id. § 12111(8).
195 1d. § 12102(2)(A).
196 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990).
19742 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
1981d. § 12102(2)(C).
'99H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52-53.
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Being statutorily disabled, however, is just the first of two condi-
tions necessary for coverage. A Title I plaintiff must also demonstrate
that he is a "qualified individual with a disability. ' '200 Such persons
are, under section 101, those "who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires. 20'1 Thus, to use a sec-
ond simple example, a deaf applicant for a file clerk position would
be a qualified individual in spite of an inability to perform the mar-
ginal task of answering the phone. 2 Even if such a task were deemed
an essential function, the applicant would qualify if a reasonable ac-
commodation, such as a TTD (Telecommunication Device for the
Deaf), would permit performance.20 3
By adopting these definitions of who is disabled and qualified,
Congress took a pragmatic approach that balanced the interests of
persons with disabilities in finding employment with the legitimate
concerns of employers. On the one hand, the definition of disability is
remarkably flexible. The statute avoids specifying what conditions
constitute a disability for fear that any list would be incomplete and
would also fail to anticipate new disorders.2 °4 Similarly, the Act calls
for an individualized assessment of disability status, 2° 5 with the result
that medical labeling will not prevent a conclusion that a person is
disabled in a particular context. The "record of' and "regarded as"
provisions serve to extend the Act's protections to those who are
needlessly penalized by third-party attitudes.
20 6
At the same time, these definitions make substantial concessions to
business interests. Most obviously, employers may still insist that
workers meet employment standards so long as they do not base per-
sonnel decisions on factors that are irrelevant or marginally related to
a job.20 7 Hence, employees must qualify for the job aside from func-
tions that are marginal or can be done with a reasonable accommoda-
tion.208 Additional boundaries to the concept of "qualified individual"
20042 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
201 ld.
202 EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE
I) OFTTHE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 2.3(a) (1992).203 See id. § 3.10(6) (describing TDD as a possible reasonable accommodation).
204 H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51.
205 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) ("[W]hether a person has a
disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry." (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
641-42 (1998))); cf 29 C.F.R § 1630.20) (2005) (concluding that Title I requires individualized
dispositions).
206 Cf Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (discussing stereotypes as the basis for the "regarded as"
prong of the statutory definition of "disability" (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Ar-
line, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987))).
207 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55.
208 Id. at 54-55.
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are set by the undue hardship and safety defenses provided by Title I.
Accommodations are deemed unreasonable when they constitute an
undue hardship for an employer 2°9 while antidiscrimination restric-
tions on qualification standards are subject to a safety defense. 21 0 The
latter permits employers to insist that an employee not pose a risk to
himself or others in the workplace.'
Title I's approach to defining its protected class seems, on first
impression, to be a sensible compromise between social progress and
business concerns. In practice, Title I's definitional limitations se-
verely limit the achievement of the Act's integrationist goals. In spite
of the Act's explicit integrationist agenda, the statutory definition of
disability embodies, in many respects, the traditional civil rights
model's assumption that a group's defining characteristics are irrele-
vant to personnel decisions. While Title VH's procedures for elimi-
nating consideration of such traits, especially disparate treatment
claims, may be effective in driving race- or gender-inspired decisions
out of the workplace, the same is untrue in matters of disability where
the disabling condition may be pertinent. The traditional civil rights
concepts lurking beneath the ADA's key definition ensure that only
persons whose disabilities are viewed as inconsequential or requiring
limited adjustments by employers will benefit from the statute. (Em-
ployer reactions to costs, of course, are different from those of Con-
gress. I shall return to this point in Subparts llI.B. and III.C.)
Speaking generally, Title I protects two broad groups of persons
with disabilities. In the first category are individuals with disabilities
that are genuinely irrelevant to working: persons who are regarded as
disabled or have a record of such (e.g., the cancer survivor);212 per-
sons whose conditions are disabling because of the attitudes of others
(e.g., the accountant with tunnel vision); those who experience dis-
crimination due to association with a person who is disabled (e.g., the
mother of an HIV-positive child); and, those whose actual disabilities
do not substantially interfere with working (e.g., the voiceless grave-
digger). Let us refer to such persons as "Category I" plaintiffs. The
traditional civil rights model and mechanisms work tolerably well for
this category. As with cases of race and gender, we can deem the un-
20942 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
210See id. § 12113(b) (including a qualification standard "that an individual shall not pose
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace").
211 Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (clarifying safety
defense to include danger to employee herself as well as to others).
212 Judge Posner has commented that Title l's "regarded as" claims most closely approxi-
mate racial discrimination claims since both phenomena involve reliance on a "vocationally
irrelevant characteristic." Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir.
1995) (Posner, J.).
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derlying impairment to be immaterial to sensible personnel decisions.
The traditional model's concern for the dignity of the individual and
its desire to banish stereotypes from labor relations flows from the
presumption that the disability at issue is extraneous. Moreover, Title
VII's all-important disparate treatment scheme works in comparable
Title I situations. Take the example of the cancer survivor who ap-
plies for a job as an entry-level bookkeeper. Such a person could
make out a prima facie case under Title I by alleging that she is either
a "regarded as" or "record of' plaintiff, meets the stated qualifications
for experience and education, and finally, that she was passed over in
favor of a later, nondisabled applicant.213 The initial inference of dis-
crimination is justified since an apparently qualified plaintiff has been
passed over in favor of a nondisabled person.
While the ADA's legislative history does not discuss Title I in
such quintessentially academic terms as the "civil rights model," there
are indications that Congress viewed the position of persons in this
broad category as comparable to those who suffer racial or gender
discrimination. The Report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor expressly viewed "regarded as" and "record of' claims as
means to protect individuals from the pointless negative attitudes of
third parties.21 4 It commented that the Act was intended to protect
"record of' plaintiffs who have recovered from disabling conditions
or been misclassified.1 5 It further noted that the "regarded as" prong
of the disability definition was intended to protect against "accumu-
lated myths and fears" regarding disability.1 6 These passages all but
use the term "irrelevant" in describing these conditions.
Reliance on the traditional model's irrelevancy standard is also
reflected by the denial of "reasonable accommodations" to certain
persons in Category I. The exclusion for plaintiffs asserting
associational discrimination is explicit in the legislative history21 7 and
has been imposed uniformly by the courts.21 8 While the availability of
accommodations for perceived disabilities is not discussed in the
legislative history, the weight of federal judicial authority holds that
Congress did not intend "regarded as" plaintiffs to receive
213 See supra Part Il.A.2 (discussing requirements for prima facie case under Title 1).
24 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52-53 (1990); see also supra note 50 and accompany-
ing text (noting statements in ADA's legislative history regarding disability discrimination as
the equivalent of racial discrimination).
2 15 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52-53.
216 Id.
2171d. at 61-62.
218 See, e.g., Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1090-92 (10th Cir. 1997) (in-
terpreting legislative history to disallow accommodations for association claims).
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accommodations. 21 9 The reasoning in these cases is strained,220 but
the majority result is sensible. Persons without actual disabling
impairments do not need accommodations to perform a job; rather,
they need an injunction that prevents or repairs the injury of
employers relying on irrelevant factors. I am unaware of any decision
regarding accommodation requirements in "record of' claims, but
there is no reason to treat this variety of perceived disability
differently than "regarded as" actions.22'
Category 1H consists of claimants who require a "reasonable ac-
commodation." Title I attempts to expand its coverage beyond the
bounds of the traditional irrelevancy standard by protecting persons
who can perform essential job functions with a reasonable accommo-
219See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that "regarded as" plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodations); Weber v.
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Workman v. Frito-Lay Inc., 165
F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th
Cir. 1998) (same). But see Williams v. Phil. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d
Cir. 2004) (holding that the text and legislative history of Title I indicate that reasonable ac-
commodations are available to "regarded as" plaintiffs); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32-
33 (ist Cir. 1996) (holding that a "regarded as" plaintiff may try the issue of reasonable accom-
modation with a jury).
220Both Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231-33, and Weber, 186 F.3d at 916-17, conclude that grant-
ing accommodations to "regarded as" plaintiffs would lead to a bizarre interpretation of the
ADA. The gist of the reasoning is that accommodating "regarded as" plaintiffs would create a
windfall in their favor since employees with impairments who were not statutorily disabled
would get nothing. The Kaplan court goes on to argue that extending the accommodations
mandate would have the perverse effect of inducing employees to encourage misperceptions by
employers. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. While this windfall theory may have merit, there is a
simpler route to this conclusion. Accommodations are required only to permit an individual to
perform the essential functions of a particular job. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (2004)
(defining "reasonable accommodation" to mean modifications that enable "a qualified individ-
ual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position"); see also Kocsis v.
Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no duty to ac-
commodate when an employee can already perform job functions). A worker who has been
misperceived as disabled has no disability to accommodate. In contrast, a worker who is im-
paired but not statutorily disabled is simply not covered by Title I.
221 School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), was techni-
cally a "record of' case under the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff, a schoolteacher, had both a
history of tuberculosis and had recently relapsed when she was dismissed. Id. at 276. It is likely
that the plaintiff would also have met the test for an actual impairment and that the Court opted
for the "record of' category as a matter of analytical convenience, that is, it was easier to point
to the record of disability than to conduct an analysis of the plaintiffs present state. The key
issue in Arline, however, was whether section 504 covered persons with contagious diseases.
After the Court responded affirmatively, it proceeded to set the parameters of the safety defense
that was later codified in Title 1. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000) ("The term 'qualification
standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.") The defense calls for a weighing of
certain factors regarding the nature of the risk, its duration and probable severity, and the prob-
ability that the disease will be transmitted. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88. More to the point, defen-
dants are obligated to provide reasonable accommodations that will reduce safety risks to ac-
ceptable levels. Id. I suggest that an accommodation requirement here makes sense only when
an actual disability is present.
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dation. At first glance, the expanded definition promotes the Act's
integrationist agenda by embracing persons whose genuine differ-
ences require government intervention to facilitate their entry into the
workforce. As discussed in Part II.C, Title I's accommodation man-
date goes beyond both the disparate treatment and impact models by
requiring employers to take affirmative steps to provide individual-
ized benefits to a class of workers or job applicants. Nor should this
expanded formulation surprise us. In a capitalist economy, even-
handed application of neutral rules will not improve the lot of persons
whose disabilities leave them at a competitive disadvantage with non-
disabled workers.222 Carrying the definition of disability beyond the
traditional model's focus on immateriality is an attempt to create a
necessary correspondence between the Act's ambitious goals and its
protected class.
Limitations on the accommodations mandate, however, roll back
the coverage in Category II to the point that it resembles the irrele-
vance standard of the traditional model. These constraints are implicit
in the very terminology chosen for the accommodations mandate.
Employers are only required to make workplace alterations that are
"reasonable." The parallel to Title VII is striking. That statute treats
reliance on the irrelevant fact of race as per se unreasonable in spite
of any compliance costs. 223 Use of gender and national origin in per-
sonnel decisions that do not meet the strict BFOQ test is similarly
disfavored.224 Title I takes the same approach for Category I plain-
tiffs. Hence, Title VII and both categories of Title I claims use rea-
sonableness as the threshold of discrimination. The primary differ-
ence in the traditional scheme (epitomized by Title VII and Category
I under the ADA) and Category 11's accommodation mandate is
treatment of costs.
Title VII, as noted in Part II.A.l.c, does not recognize a cost de-
fense. The reasoning of Johnson Controls prevents Title VII defen-
dants from arguing that race- or gender-conscious classifications are
economically rational or even designed to avoid the economic conse-
quences of customer preferences or coworker reactions. It would, of
course, be an error to argue that third-party attitudes do not impose
costs on employers. A heterogeneous workforce (in some circum-
222 See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Em-
ployment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BuFF. L. REV. 123, 134 (1998) (noting limits
on economic competitiveness of persons with disabilities); id. at 135-38 (arguing that simple
nondiscrimination commands do not respond to the fact that disabilities impose economic limi-
tations).
223 See supra Part Bl.A.l.a (discussing the irrelevance of defining traits).224 See id.
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stances) may result in lost sales or higher personnel management
costs. 225 That imposition is tolerable, however, since the negative
attitudes giving rise to these costs will fade, one hopes, as the civil
rights agenda operates as a catalyst to transform popular feelings
about race or gender in America.226 Accommodation costs under Title
I, in contrast, are "real" in the sense that they require direct expendi-
tures or variations in work procedures. Aside from truly cost-free
accommodations, an employer must bear the initial and sometimes
continuing expense of workplace alterations. Such costs may persist
even if accommodations yield the desired result of creating an
enlightened workplace imbued with a sense of inclusion and height-
ened awareness that comes from successful collaboration between
persons with and without disabilities.
Since accommodations often entail costs (some small, some large)
and since labor expenses are a legitimate concern for employers, Title
I limits coverage to reasonable accommodation demands. Title I itself
does not offer a general definition of what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation; rather, it proceeds by example, stating that reason-
able accommodations may include such actions as job restructuring,
provision of interpreters, and so forth.227 The judiciary has provided
definitional refinements, fashioning a two-step approach to issues of
reasonableness. Title I plaintiffs lead off by demonstrating that a pro-
posed accommodation is "reasonable in the run of cases., 228 This is
an easy standard. Plaintiffs simply have a burden of production rather
than persuasion. 2 9 Equally important, the standard is objective and
does not consider the employer's individual circumstances.23° Once
plaintiffs meet this minimal burden, defendants are obliged to respond
by raising the affirmative defense of undue hardship. The latter con-
cept is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty or ex-
pense ' 23' and must be judged by reference to certain factors pertinent
to the defendant's operations.232 While the defendant need not go as
225 See EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 69-72 (discussing advantages of homogeneous work-
force in internal governance).226 See Verkerke, supra note 188, at 1411 (noting capacity of antidiscrimination rules to set
new social norms and alter popular attitudes).
22742 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
228 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002) (quoting Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d
1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
2 29 Id.
230 Id.
231 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
2321d. § 1211 1(10)(B). These factors are numerous and include: the nature and cost of the
accommodation, the financial resources of the facility in question, the number of persons em-
ployed at such facility, the effect on expenses and resources, the impact of an accommodation
on operations, and so forth.
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far as demonstrating imminent bankruptcy, 233 meeting the undue
hardship standard is plainly more difficult than the plaintiff's trifling
burden of production on the issue of reasonableness.
Title I's allocation of proof burdens on reasonableness and undue
hardship is decidedly pro-plaintiff. In the larger scheme of things,
however, limiting relief to reasonable accommodations erects a stone
wall within the larger class of persons with disabilities. On one side of
that barrier are persons whose impairments are not so serious that
they require overly expensive accommodations. We are willing to
grant accommodations to persons whose presence does not unduly
impinge on a business operation. Here, a refusal to accommodate is
not reasonable since business operations are largely unaffected. We
regard an employer's rejection of the supposedly light accommoda-
tion burden as the functional equivalent of relying on race, gender, or
other immutable traits. Across the "reasonableness" line are persons
whose impairments prove unacceptably expensive to accommodate.
Under the Title I scheme, these costs are deemed relevant. We regard
personnel actions based on them to be unbiased in ways that reliance
on race and gender are not. In effect, Title I's protected class has
more in common with victims of racial or gender bias than with those
who have occupationally disqualifying impairments.
Why do we stop coverage at the edge of cost-defined reasonable-
ness? Why does Title I favor persons with less serious impairments?
The simple answer is that going further would be too costly for em-
ployers. The legislative history makes clear that the undue hardship
defense was included at the insistence of business interests.234 To say
that broader coverage is too expensive, however, begs the question of
what the ADA-and the law generally-should do in favor of persons
with disabilities. There is no inherent reason to say that persons with
severe impairments are less likely to benefit from integration into the
workplace. Indeed, there is a good argument that the benefits of an
integrationist regime-both to the individual and to society-increase
with the severity of impairment and diminish only when an individual
is too incapacitated for any sort of job.
233 Compare Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 136 n.2 (2d Cir. 1995)
(questioning bankruptcy view of undue hardship), and Van Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44
F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (same), with Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(suggesting that undue hardship arises when an accommodation would fundamentally alter a
defendant's operations).234 See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 65 U. Prrr. L. REv. 597, 611 & n.101 (2004) (noting that undue hardship
provision was a compromise demanded by business interests who objected to broad accommo-
dation provisions in earlier drafts of the ADA).
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No right-thinking person would maintain that employers should be
liable for any and all costs associated with bringing an individual with
a disability into the workplace. 5 Limitless liability is incompatible
with our profit-driven, capitalist system. It might even have the per-
verse effect of drawing workers with disabilities to firms that have
successfully accommodated in the past and away from recalcitrant
employers.236 The ADA, however, errs in the opposite direction. Title
I's expansive version of the traditional irrelevance threshold has ex-
cluded the class of persons with the greatest need from the principal
statute setting disability policy in the workplace. Reliance on the Title
VII model, moreover, cuts off alternative strategies for achieving the
socially beneficial goal of moving persons with disabilities into the
workplace. That strategies such as wide-scale tax credits for hires,
subsidies for on-the-job-training, or even hiring quotas are forms of
affirmative action should not dissuade us from considering them as
part of a truly genuine integrationist policy. Let me be clear that I am
neither advocating nor rejecting any of these options. My point is that
the traditional civil rights mentality curtails Title I's ability to reach
its integrationist goals.
B. The Procedural Approach to Regulating Hiring Decisions
Clearing the definition hurdle is simply the first step toward em-
ployment under Title I. After the Act's definitions have excluded an
indeterminate but substantial number of persons, the remaining "cov-
ered" individuals must still convince an employer to hire them. Here
the ADA builds upon the pattern of the traditional civil rights model
by taking an essentially procedural approach to regulating hiring. As
set out more fully in Part II.A, Title VII does not mandate hiring in
any particular instance. Rather, it attempts to banish consideration of
irrelevancies such as race and gender from personnel decisions. With
regard to hiring decisions, Title I also takes aim at the methods by
which employers arrive at personnel decisions. Unlike sections 501
and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, which impose affirmative action
requirements on federal employers and federal contractors respec-
tively,237 Title I has no employment targets. Rather, the Act ap-
235 Cf. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 399-401 (2002) (rejecting argument that
concept of reasonable accommodation refers to effectiveness without regard to costs).
236 See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Em-
ployment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 307, 346-47 (2001) (noting possibility that disabled workers will cluster in workplaces that
tend to offer accommodations).
237 See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (b) (2000) (requiring all federal agencies to develop affirmative ac-
tion plans for "hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities"); id.
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proaches the hiring issue indirectly by attempting to control informa-
tion about disability. There are reasons to doubt that this attempt has
been successful.
Title I's device for controlling information about disability is sec-
tion 102(d), which governs preemployment inquiries into disability
status and medical examinations.23 8 Perhaps sensing that enforcement
at the hiring stage would be tricky, Congress included a rule against
preemployment medical examinations and inquiries into disability
status.23 9 The gist of the rules is that employers may not, at the
preoffer stage, subject applicants to medical examinations or ask
questions regarding disability status. The latter prohibitions include
indirect inquiries such as: "Have you ever filed for workers' compen-
sation insurance?" 240 Employers may only ask whether and how an
applicant would perform job-related functions.24 ' Job offers may be
conditioned on medical exams so long as all entering employees are
subjected to the same requirement.24 2
Rules prohibiting preoffer inquiries and exams epitomize the pro-
cedural nature of Title I. The obvious goal of these restrictions is to
create a hiring environment free of irrelevant information about dis-
ability whenever possible. Hiring decisions could then purely be
based on issues of competence and comparative advantage. This
laudable concept works well in theory but seems to fail in practice.
Job applicants with "invisible" disabilities, such as alcoholism or a
prior cancer diagnosis, are most likely to benefit from the preoffer
bans. It is inevitable, however, that apparent disabilities, such as par-
tial paralysis or blindness, will enter into the thoughts of potential
employers. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance acknowledges this
fact when it gives employers latitude to ask applicants with known
disabilities how they would be able to perform a job, even if other
applicants are not so queried.2 43
§ 793(a) (requiring parties to federal contracts of $10,000 or more to take affirmative action to
hire qualified individuals with disabilities).
23842 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000).
2
3
9
1d. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
240 EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE
I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILrrIs ACT § 5.5(b) (1992).
24129 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 380 (2004) (commenting on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a)).
24242 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A).
24329 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 380 (2004) (commenting on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a)). The
example given in the Interpretive Guidance is: "an employer may ask an individual with one leg
who applies for a position as a home washing machine repairman to demonstrate or to explain
how, with or without reasonable accommodation, he would be able to transport himself and his
tools down basement stairs." Id.
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Now we reach a "tipping point" in the statutory scheme. Employ-
ers must ignore visible impairments while attempting to assess the
benefits of hiring particular applicants if the Act is to achieve its inte-
grative goals. This reliance on goodwill and mental discipline places
too much faith in human nature. For reasons developed at greater
length in Subpart HI.C, the primary motivation for refusing to hire a
person with visible disabilities-or applicants who have identified
themselves as disabled-is probably fear of costs. Such concerns may
take several forms, ranging from direct expenditures for reasonable
accommodations to loss of worker flexibility to fear of legal liability.
As anticipated costs increase, so does employer motivation not to hire
a worker with a disability. How does Title I react to this possibility?
In my opinion, the procedural nature of the Act's hiring rules encour-
ages it.
Recall that Title I mandates no particular result in questions of hir-
ing, promotion, or retention. An employer may take any action re-
garding a "qualified individual with a disability" so long as the dis-
ability was not a factor in the decision. For example, preferring a
nondisabled job applicant when a qualified applicant with a disability
had equal education and experience would not violate Title 1.244 It is
probably acceptable to prefer the nondisabled applicant with inferior
credentials so long as the decision was not based on the fact of a
competitor's disability. 245 The ADA was not intended to preempt em-
ployer discretion in the subtle process of building and managing an
effective workforce.2 46 Violations occur when an employer allows
disability to become a factor in the decision.
Consider also that hiring is an inescapably comparative process by
which employers attempt to find the best match for an open position.
The fact that an applicant can perform the essential functions of a
vacant job, with or without an accommodation, qualifies her for pro-
tection under Title I as a "qualified individual with a disability." It
does not get her a job. An employer may legitimately prefer a nondis-
abled employee for a multitude of job-related reasons. When done
right, hiring is a matter of sifting through nuances. For example, a
244 See Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 378 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2004); Malabarba v. Chi.
Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Title I does not require that indi-
viduals with disabilities be given priority in hiring).245 See Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
271, 283 (2000) (implying that employers may prefer nondisabled applicant with inferior cre-
dentials to an applicant with a disability-but who does not request an accommodation-in the
absence of discriminatory motive).
246See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that
the ADA does not require affirmative action).
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retailer may favor a nondisabled applicant over an otherwise equally
qualified individual with a disability on the grounds that the former's
references indicate extraordinary self-control in dealing with angry
customers. Indeed, a good personnel manager would never use such a
stiff test as whether someone can perform the essential functions of a
job. Such an approach all but takes professional judgment out the
hiring process.
Title I's inability to remove consideration of obvious disabilities
from personnel decisions, in tandem with its reluctance to curtail hir-
ing discretion, makes employment of "qualified individuals" optional.
Well-counseled employers can always shape a job search file to re-
flect that the successful applicant was chosen for neutral, job-related
reasons. Employers who are concerned about the costs associated
with a particular applicant can simply decline to hire and later offer
seemingly legitimate reasons based on comparative qualifications. If
an employer is concerned that its failure to hire individuals with dis-
abilities over time suggests a pattern of discrimination, she could en-
gage in "cream-skimming," that is, strategic hires of persons with less
serious disabilities in order to avoid taking on persons with more se-
247vere impairments.
Dynamics unique to the hiring process, moreover, make successful
Title I enforcement actions unlikely. Except for cases in which the
EEOC becomes involved, 248 enforcement depends on a complaint or a
charge by a disappointed applicant.249 A charge, in turn, depends upon
the applicant becoming convinced that discrimination has occurred.
Such an event is far less likely to occur at the hiring stage. Incumbent
employees may have a course of dealings with management that
could suggest discriminatory motives, as well as a sense of job own-
ership that prompts a person to defend his position from threats of
discipline or dismissal. Job applicants lack these contextual clues
about employer behaviors. Nowadays, most personnel managers are
trained to be consistently polite and encouraging. Good manners go a
long way in diffusing frustrations over denial of employment. Equally
important, the applicant usually does not see the competition. He will
not get the sense of discrimination that comes from seeing a job go to
247 See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 168, at 275 & n. 100 ("[The ADA] may
stimulate the employment of some people with disabilities via "creaming" of those workers with
the least-serious disabilities .... " (quoting Richard V. Burkhauser et al., How People with
Disabilities Fare When Public Policies Change, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251, 264-65
(1993))).
248 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (granting EEOC enforcement powers under Title I
comparable to its power to enforce Title VII under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000)).
249 See id. (authorizing individuals to enforce Title I); see also id. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (requir-
ing that charges be filed within 180 days with EEOC or 300 days with authorized state agency).
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someone he thinks is less qualified. Finally, applicants just do not
have the same sense of possessiveness about a job as a sitting em-
ployee. Human nature leaves us less motivated to defend a lost oppor-
tunity than a lost position.
How often are "qualified individuals" turned away at the hiring
stage? I would not hazard a precise guess but am convinced that the
phenomenon occurs frequently. While there does not appear to be
empirical findings on this exact point, existing information implies
that employers are practicing a form of negative selection at the hiring
stage. EEOC statistics indicate that only about 10 percent of charges
involve allegations of hiring discrimination while the balance pertains
to post-hiring issues.250 This information tends to confirm the obser-
vation that job applicants are less litigious than incumbent employees.
More important, the fact that employment rates for persons with dis-
abilities declined after the ADA's enactment coupled with a decline
in dismissals2 5' suggests that the ADA's negative effects center on the
hiring process.
It is instructive to compare the ADA's influence on the hiring
process to its effects on incumbent employees. If I am correct that
Title I lacks positive effects on initial employment decisions, then we
should expect that persons with disabilities in the workforce will tend
to fall into one of three groups. First, there will be those whose im-
pairments were "invisible" at the time of hiring. Although employers
who comply with the prehiring prohibition on disability inquiries are
still likely to pass over applicants with known disabilities, we can
expect them to hire applicants with invisible impairments such as
alcoholism or certain mental illnesses-unless the applicants volun-
teer the information. Second, there are employees who become dis-
abled after being hired. EEOC charge data, for example, indicate that
20.9 percent of merit resolution claims involve nonparalytic orthope-
dic (8.4 percent) and orthopedic and structural impairments of the
back (11.8 percent).252 These categories of impairments are associated
250 See Jan William Stumer, Arbitration, Labor Contracts, and the ADA: The Benefits of
Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements and an Update on the Conflict Between the Duty To Ac-
commodate and Seniority Rights, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 455, 469 & n.61 (1999)
(citing EEOC statistics indicating that from July 26, 1992--the effective date of the ADA-
through September 30, 1997, only 9.4 percent of charges received by the EEOC related to
hiring); Willbom, supra note 168, at 103 (noting that the ratio of discharge to hiring cases is ten
to one under Title D.
251 See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. OF POL. ECON. 915,941-42 (2001).
232 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ADA Charge Data by Impair-
ments/Bases - Merit Factor Resolutions, http://www.eeoc.gov/statslada-merit.html (Jan. 27,
2005) (citing cumulative total percentages between July 26, 1992 to September 30, 2004). Merit
resolution claims include settlements, withdrawals with benefits, successful conciliations, and
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with long-term physical labor, such as lifting or typing. Finally, there
are employees who were hired in spite of a known disability, that is,
applicants who did not need the ADA since employers viewed them
positively.
Persons falling into these categories may occupy their jobs for
some time before conflicts arise. To my knowledge, published statis-
tics do not sort out claims by length of time on the job before a charge
is filed. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that many conditions
will take time to manifest and interfere with work performance. Alco-
holics tend to have well-honed coping skills that allow them to per-
form a job for a long time before bottoming out. Back impairments
and repetitive motion disorders often develop over years. Cancers
may be diagnosed in the prime of a career.
Reactions of incumbent employees to adverse job actions are in-
evitably different from those of passed-over applicants. The desire to
defend employment status is an aspect of human nature's command
that we defend our possessions.253 The longer a worker remains in a
position, the stronger the possessory sentiment becomes. Fear of long-
term unemployment may also come into play. A worker with a mani-
fest disability has good reason to fear reentry into the labor market.
For such an individual, a record of discharge or discipline may com-
plicate the usual hiring-stage problems for persons with known dis-
abilities. Another difference between employees and applicants is that
the former are usually aware of the process that has led to an adverse
job action. Unlike applicants, who typically do not see the hiring
process unfold, incumbent employees have a course of dealings with
management and fellow employees that may suggest unfair treatment.
EEOC charge statistics confirm that incumbent employees tend to
pursue enforcement proceedings under Title I. For the period from
July 26, 1992 though September 30, 1997, nearly nine-tenths of
charges pertained to the post-hiring stage.2 4 Complaints regarding
hiring, in contrast, accounted for only 9.4 percent of charges.255
Ironically, post-hiring accommodation claims are usually unsuccess-
unsuccessful conciliations. Id.
253 See Weber, supra note 222, at 133 n.52 (noting that the prevalence of discharge charges
"supports Judge Friendly's point that people are more likely to be concerned over the loss of
something they have than the failure to get something they want" (citing Henry Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975))).
254 Over half of all charges related to discharge (52.3 percent) while 29 percent concerned
a failure to provide reasonable accommodations, 12.6 percent harassment, 8 percent discipline,
4.5 percent layoff, 3.9 percent promotion, 3.8 percent benefits, 3.5 percent wages, 3.3 percent
rehiring, and 2.3 percent suspension. See Stumer, supra note 250, at 469 & nn.61-63.255 Id.
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ful in spite of the incumbent employee's greater willingness to bring
enforcement actions. EEOC charge data indicate that the Commission
found that only 17.8 percent of charges were meritorious. 256
Claimants also fare poorly in federal courts. Professor Colker's study
of federal court dispositions determined that employers had a 93
percent success rate in federal district courts and an 84 percent rate on
appeal.257
While Title I's attempt at regulating post-hiring conditions may
seem as unsuccessful as the recruitment-stage rules against inquiries
and medical examinations, the reasons for the former likely have
nothing to do with the traditional civil rights elements in the ADA.
The dynamics of Title I's post-hiring rules are different. Unlike the
hiring rules, rules protecting incumbent employees are essentially
substantive. At this stage, Title I is no longer preoccupied with con-
trolling or ignoring information about disability status. In fact, it posi-
tively encourages employers to acquire information about a worker's
disabilities, permitting any inquiries that are job related and consistent
with business necessity. 25 8 Since information about a worker's dis-
abilities is on the table (or could be), the focus now becomes whether
a specific employee, under the circumstances, is entitled to a reason-
able accommodation or has been discharged because of a failure to
grant one. This analysis also lacks the comparative quality of a hiring
decision. In sum, the emphasis on individual entitlement moves post-
employment claims away from the traditional civil rights model, in
which the defining trait is irrelevant, into a context where the nature
of a disability is paramount. The issue now is whether a redistributive
act should occur in light of a legal standard.
Many advocates assert that plaintiffs' poor success rates stem from
the federal bench's hostility toward the ADA.259 While it is possible
256 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1992 - FY 2003, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (Jan. 27,
2005). Merit resolution statistics do not distinguish between hiring and post-hiring claims. It is
fair to assume, however, that most are post-hiring charges. See Sturner, supra note 250, at 469
& nn.61-63.
257 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999); see also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 248-57 (2001) (finding that defendants
gain full reversal in 42 percent of appeals and reductions in the damages in another 17.5 percent
of cases, while plaintiffs obtain reversal in only 12 percent of cases); ABA Commission on
Mental and Physical Disability, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998)
(noting that Title I employment plaintiffs win in 7.89 percent of cases).258 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2000) (permitting inquiries "shown to be job-related
and consistent with business necessity").
251 E.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19 (2000); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword - Backlash Against
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that plaintiffs lose ADA claims for lack of merit, a suggestion of a
judicial reaction against Title I is not implausible. The Supreme Court
has gone out of its way to narrow the statutory definition of who
qualifies as disabled by holding that determination of disability status
must be judged in light of mitigating circumstances 260 and by taking
a narrow view of what is a major life activity. 261 Conclusions on this
point, however, must remain tentative. Whatever judicial hostility
actually exists, many incumbent employees may have experienced
success in gaining accommodations in less formal settings. Remem-
ber that separations from employment do not appear to have increased
since the enactment of the ADA.262 It is possible that some employers
have opted to grant accommodations rather than absorb the cost of
defending claims. An unfortunate lack of data concerning negotiated
settlements or informal resolutions of Title I disputes makes it diffi-
cult to determine the degree to which employers engage in such stra-
tegic behavior, much less the true prevalence of accommodations in
263the workplace.
It is also unclear whether more vigorous enforcement at the post-
hiring phase would make a significant difference. A more sympa-
thetic EEOC or federal bench might result in more dispositions re-
quiring the provision of accommodation or reinstatements. I find it
difficult to believe that success in post-hiring claims would alter the
composition of the workforce. Incumbent workers with disabilities
are generally the same people who would have been hired in the ab-
sence of the ADA. These are workers who were deemed "safe bets"
either because they had no obvious impairment at the point of hiring
or their disabilities were deemed inconsequential. Title I's adoption of
the traditional civil rights model's procedurally oriented hiring
scheme leaves employers free to continue to avoid hiring persons
with known disabilities. Successful enforcement of post-hiring ac-
commodation claims would probably have the ironic effect of making
employers even more reluctant to hire persons with disabilities.
the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000).
260 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,482 (1999).
261 See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-98 (2002) ("We...
hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives.").262 See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 251, at 940-41.
263 Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of The ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213,
1245-46 (2003).
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C. The Cost Problem
In the film All the President's Men, depicting the Washington
Post's investigation of the Watergate Scandal, a mysterious inside
source called "Deep Throat" (played by Hal Holbrook) counseled
reporters Bob Woodward (played by Robert Redford) and Carl Bern-
stein (played by Dustin Hoffman) to "follow the money.''264 This gen-
erally sound advice also holds true for investigating Title I's failure to
make significant progress toward its integrationist goals. The nub of
the problem is that mandating accommodations imposes costs on em-
ployers that they would rather avoid. Congress, in my view, failed to
appreciate the effect of accommodation costs on employment prac-
tices, particularly at the hiring stage. Title I's provision that employ-
ers absorb "reasonable" costs for accommodations reflects the tradi-
tional civil rights model's normative, moral view that cost concerns
cannot ratify decisions that are based on immutable characteristics.
While subordination of economic goals to social goals is commonly
accepted in matters of race and gender, the effects have apparently
been less desirable in matters of disability policy.
Title VII tends to be indifferent to employer concerns about the
costs of taking on workers in protected classes. Disparate treatment
claims under Title VII are not subject to business necessity or cost
defenses. This exclusion reflects the traditional model's desire to pro-
tect minorities from stigmatizing suggestions of inferiority. Hence,
the gender-conscious pension system in Manhart and the job exclu-
sions in Johnson Controls were impermissible even if they were eco-
nomically rational. 265 The closest approximation to a cost defense in
disparate treatment claims is the BFOQ defense. One could argue that
casting a woman as Henry V might reduce box office receipts consid-
erably (in spite of the novelty value). Concerns over costs, however,
seem secondary to the BFOQ's desire to preserve artistic integrity.166
Only in disparate impact cases does Title VH trouble itself with
costs. Employers may raise a business necessity defense to a claim
that a neutral rule disproportionately affects a protected class.267 Tak-
ing employer costs into account does seem more acceptable in dispa-
rate impact claims since the superficially neutral rules at issue do not
264 ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner Brothers 1976).
265 L.A. Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 449 U.S. 187 (1991); see supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
266See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2)
(2004) (indicating that gender may be a BFOQ for acting due to the need for "authenticity or
genuineness").267 See Sullivan supra note 158, at 1513-15 and accompanying text.
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have the same stigmatizing effect as direct race or gender classifica-
tions. The cases do not, however, paint a clear picture of the permis-
sibility of considering the costs of reaching less discriminatory equi-
libriums in job rules or requirements.268 Perhaps it is better to view
the business necessity defense in noneconomic terms. I have argued
elsewhere that disparate impact scenarios may be better regarded as
creating an inference of discriminatory motivation. 269 By demonstrat-
ing business necessity, the defendant proves that his or her motiva-
tions were proper commercial factors rather than an improper bias.270
The Court, however, takes the traditional view.27'
Title I shares the traditional civil rights model's moralistic view
that even genuine cost factors should remain a limited factor in the
antidiscrimination calculus. Section 102(b)(1) of the ADA, which
creates disparate treatment liability, recognizes no cost defense at
272
all. Disparate impact claims, epitomized by section 102(b)(6)'s ban
on qualification standards that tend to screen out individuals or
classes with disabilities, follows Title VII by providing a business
necessity defense.273 Disparate treatment and impact claims, however,
274
make up a small portion of ADA claims. The typical Title I claim-
ant alleges harm from the denial of an accommodation. Even here,
though, Congress took a moral view of costs.
Congress's decision to privilege moral over economic concerns is
implicit in Title I's dual mechanism for addressing concerns over
268 Compare Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971) (disallow-
ing cost defense in challenge to seniority system), and Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d
1122, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that savings to taxpayers do not justify compensation sys-
tem with disparate racial impact), with Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th
Cir. 1983) (recognizing business necessity defense based on cost of extending employer-
provided health insurance).
269 Leonard, Bilingualism, supra note 68, at 96-97.
27 0 Id.
271 See Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51-52 (2003) (holding that disparate im-
pact claims require no showing of a subjective intent to discriminate).
272 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(l) (2000).
273 Id. § 12112(b)(6). Additionally, Title I's ban on standards, criteria, and methods of ad-
ministration with discriminatory effects, id. § 12112(b)(3), lacks an explicit reference to a busi-
ness necessity defense, as does the rule against testing devices that measure disability rather
than skill, id. § 12112(b)(7). The EEOC, however, has supplied such a defense by regulation.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2004) (establishing a business necessity defense for disparate
impact claims).
274 EEOC statistics alluded to in Part Il.B, see Sturner, supra notes 250, 254-56 and ac-
companying text, indicate that discharge claims accounted for 52.3 percent of charges while
failure to accommodate claims tallied only 29 percent for the period from July 26, 1992 through
September 30, 1997. These statistics understate the role of the accommodation mandate since
discharge claimants often contend that a failure to accommodate led to a dismissal. The com-
mon perception is that most claims involve accommodations. See, e.g., Alison M. Barnes, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Aging Athlete After Casey Martin, 12 MARQ. SPORTs L.
REV. 67, 86 (2001) (noting that most Title I claims involve demands for accommodations).
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accommodation costs. The first is the requirement that accommoda-
tions be "reasonable." This requirement has been applied in a decid-
edly pro-employee fashion. The Court's recent decision in US Air-
ways, Inc. v. Barnett275 observed that plaintiffs have the burden of
demonstrating that a proposed accommodation is "reasonable on its
face. 276 Although Justice Breyer's opinion gives little guidance as to
the threshold of reasonableness, it cites with approval lower court
decisions that deem accommodations acceptable so long as expenses
are not disproportionate to the benefits realized. 7 This is an objective
standard that compares costs to the employer with benefits conferred
on the worker. This analysis pointedly avoids the sort of calculation
that employers want to perform: the effects of incremental costs on
profitability. The employer is further disadvantaged by the tendency
of many lower courts to impose only a burden of production on plain-
tiffs. 278 Once the plaintiff brings forward some plausible evidence of
reasonableness, the employer must respond by raising the difficult
affirmative defense of undue hardship. 2
79
Undue hardship is Title I's primary mechanism for screening out
unacceptably expensive accommodations. Section 102(b)(5) of the
Act requires that employers provide needed accommodations for
known disabilities of workers unless they would thereby incur "undue
hardship. '280 The Act defines this situation vaguely as "significant
difficulty or expense,' 281 then provides subjective factors to consider
whether an undue hardship has arisen: the nature and cost of the ac-
commodation, the financial resources of the facility in question and of
the defendant as a whole, and the type of operation involved.282 Ulti-
mately the evidence must show that an accommodation would signifi-
cantly hurt the defendant's business, though the employer need not go
so far as to prove that bankruptcy is imminent.283 Significantly, undue
hardship is an affirmative defense for which the defendant bears the
burden of proof.284 From a procedural perspective, defendants obvi-
275 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
276 Id. at 401.
277 d. at 402 (citing, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.
1995)).
278 See, e.g., Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138 (holding that plaintiff bears only a burden of pro-
duction).279 See Bamett, 535 U.S. at 402 ("Once the plaintiff has [met the burden of production],
the defendant/employer then must show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that
demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.").
2842 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
281 
Id. § 1211 (10)(A).
282 1d. § 1211 l(10)(B)(i)-(iv).
283 See sources and cases cited supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
2M Bamett, 535 U.S. at 402.
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ously face greater difficulties in establishing undue hardship than do
plaintiffs in demonstrating the reasonableness of an accommodation.
Even though Title I uses the language of costs and economic bur-
dens, the undue hardship rules are in reality more a statement of an
employer's moral (and now legal) obligation to assist workers with
disabilities. Employers-at least theoretically-hire workers because
they contribute more to a firm than they cost. Under the standard la-
bor demand model, employer behavior in hiring is governed by a de-
sire to maximize a firm's profits. 285 Demand for labor is greatly influ-
enced by its cost.2 86 Hence, employers are willing to purchase more
units of labor when per unit costs are low and fewer as they increase.
Hiring ceases under the standard model when the marginal cost of a
unit of labor exceeds the marginal revenue product, that is, the reve-
nue generated by that unit.
287
Undue hardship is too remote from the dynamics of labor demand
to be considered an economic concept or a cost control mechanism. In
an unregulated environment, good faith employers will make their
bottom line calculations then hire or fire accordingly. Undue hardship
ignores the normal mechanics of personnel decisions and asks in-
stead: how much can an employer bear before something breaks?
Except in extreme situations, Title I disregards the profitability of
accommodated positions. At best, the cost of an accommodation is a
single factor in the undue hardship calculation.288 Nor does the Act
make any attempt to distribute the costs of accommodations among
employers. 289 The fact that an employer has successfully accommo-
dated a worker with a disability does not alter its responsibility to
accommodate the next applicant. Likewise, the fact that a competing
employer has yet to hire any workers with disabilities is beside the
point.
Congress in effect took a moral view of accommodation expenses.
Regarding the class of persons who do meet the statutory definition of
disability, Title I's accommodation mandate reflects a conclusion by
285 E.g., Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 245, at 283 n.65 (citing RONALD G. EHRENBERG
& ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (4th ed.
1991)). Standard labor theory also makes the unrealistic but analytically facilitating assumption
that individuals and firms always act rationally, have perfect market information, and work in
perfectly competitive labor and product markets. Id.
286See id. at 286. ("If capital and customer buying behavior is fixed, the amount of labor
demanded is a function of its costs ... .287 See id.
288 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10)(B) (2000) (listing cost as only one of several factors in un-
due hardship calculus); see also Van Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that financial condition of the employer is only one consideration in determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship).289 Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 236, at 346-48.
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Congress that it is fair to impose obligations on employers if the bur-
den is relatively light. So long as the demanded accommodation is
reasonable (as defined by the courts rather than the market), does not
create an "undue" hardship, does not invoke safety concerns, and
permits the worker to perform the core functions of a job, the em-
ployer's cost concerns melt away in favor of a congressional judg-
ment that the employer has no legitimate reason to oppose assisting a
worker with a disability. Put differently, the refusal to spend money is
the moral equivalent of an inherently unreasonable decision to con-
sider race or gender in a personnel matter. For the sympathetic mind,
it is a short leap from the established axiom that race or gender are
occupationally irrelevant to the new contention that disabilities re-
dressable by "reasonable" accommodations should not influence per-
sonnel outcomes negatively.
It is unsurprising that Congress took a moral view of accommoda-
tion costs. Before the ADA, Congress had limited experience with
mandatory accommodations in the civil rights sphere. Title VII in-
cluded a provision for accommodation of workers' religious prefer-
ences, extending protection to religious observances and practices
unless the employer could demonstrate an undue hardship.2 90 This
requirement, however, was gutted by the Supreme Court's decision in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.2 91 It is true that recipients of
federal funds have been obliged to accommodate workers with dis-
abilities since the issuance of regulations under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act in 1977.292 These obligations, however, are ac-
cepted voluntarily. Title I, in contrast, aims to regulate all but the
smallest employers 293 and thus represents an attempt to regulate the
labor market. Finally, Congress likely believed that most accommo-
dation costs would be minimal. Witnesses in hearings on the ADA
suggested that the average accommodation was inexpensive, 294 that
costs were often exaggerated,295 and that technology would reduce
expenses.z96 A perception that accommodations were usually not
29042 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
291432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (limiting the accommodation mandate to requests involving no
more than de minimis costs).292 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or
Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977).
29342 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (2000) (limiting Title I coverage to employers with fifteen or
more employees).
294See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 33 (1990) (referring to statement of Jay
Rochlin that a majority of accommodations are inexpensive). S. REP. No. 101-116 at 10 (1989)
(summarizing testimony that most accommodations cost less than $50).
295 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34 (referring to statement of Evan Kemp that
Sears and Roebuck made its national headquarters accessible for $7,600).296 See id. (referring to statement of Charles Crawford that technology will reduce accom-
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pricey no doubt reinforced the view that nonaccommodation was
simply unreasonable and therefore wrong.
Why does all this matter? Legislative conceptions of "fairness" or
good social policy must inevitably deal with the realities of economic
conditions and employment practices. Human nature, particularly the
desire for profit and prosperity, is difficult to alter by legislative fiat.
In the normal flow of events, business managers want to minimize
costs in order to maximize profits. Indeed, employer concerns about
accommodation costs were evident in their insistence on an undue
hardship defense during the ADA's legislative process. 297 The emer-
gence of a political compromise on accommodation costs, however, is
no indication that employers will voluntarily curb their customary
economic behaviors.
If I am correct that Title I's procedural approach to hiring has ren-
dered the statute difficult to enforce,298 then we should expect em-
ployers to exploit this gap in Title I to avoid hiring workers who de-
mand accommodations in favor of equally qualified workers who do
not. Even if the average accommodation cost is as cheap as the con-
gressional witnesses suggested, there is no reason to believe that
profit-maximizing employers would not take advantage of smaller
savings. Some accommodations will prove very expensive.299 A typi-
cal employer's reaction to an accommodation demand, however, is
likely to turn on factors besides upfront outlays. She is likely to enter-
tain the possibility that a disability may worsen over time and require
more extensive accommodations. Employees who can perform the
essential functions of the job in question-but few others-lack the
quality of flexibility that most employers desire. Finally, why take a
chance on someone who may sue you later when equally qualified
nondisabled applicants are available?
Cost avoidance by employers has probably played an important
role in the ADA's failure to improve the employment status of per-
sons with disabilities. Two employment studies have come to the
conclusion that Title I's accommodation mandate actually depressed
employment of persons with disabilities. The DeLeire study, which
observed that employment rates for men relative to their nondisabled
modation costs).297 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
298 See supra Part llI.B (discussing the tendency of Title I's procedurally oriented rule to
facilitate the nonhiring of persons with disabilities).
299See, e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1514, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the plaintiffs request that her employer pay $300 to $520 per month for a parking
space, that is, 15-26 percent of a worker's salary, may be a reasonable accommodation).
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counterparts decreased by 7.2 percent from 1990 through 1995," 0
suggested that disemployment was attributable to increased labor
costs from the ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate. 30 1 De-
Leire rejected the explanation that relative losses in employment were
caused by a disincentive to work brought on by increased federal dis-
ability insurance payments.0 2 He did not, however, find evidence that
the ADA had caused a decrease in wage rates.30 3
Acemoglu and Angrist's study also attributed the declines in
employment to the added costs imposed by the ADA's reasonable
accommodation mandate coupled with its equal pay provision, which
prohibits employers from offsetting accommodation costs through
lower wages. 304 They found generally that increased transfer
payments (for example, Supplemental Security Income or disability
insurance) could not account for diminished employment, 30 5 while
acknowledging that such income sources might play a role in
employment outcomes for men aged forty to fifty-eight.306 They also
speculated that the better results for workers aged forty to fifty-eight,
generally, and for women especially, may be related to the fact that,
prior to the ADA, all such workers were covered by the age
discrimination rules of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA).3 °7 Similarly, improved results for women may be
because women were protected by the gender discrimination rules of
Title VII.
308
Conclusions in the DeLeire and Acemoglu/Angrist studies
correspond to what common sense tells us about price fluctuations.
All things being equal, we buy more as the price falls and vice versa.
There are also theoretical reasons to suspect that accommodation
costs have affected employment levels among workers with
disabilities. Mandated worker benefits are likely to be
counterproductive if one's goal is to maintain or increase employment
levels. A model developed by Lawrence Summers, former Treasury
Secretary and presently Harvard President, for general application
mandates in unregulated labor markets predicts that such
interventions may lead to decreased employment levels under certain
300 Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 705 (2000).301 Id. at 708.
302 Id. at 708-09.
3 0
3 Id. at 705.
304 Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 251, at 950.
305 Id. at 936-37.
306 Id. at 949.
307 Id. at 949-50.
308 Id. at 950.
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circumstances. 3° More specifically, Summers reasons that one of two
things should happen when comprehensive mandates are imposed. If
the value of the mandated benefit to the workers is greater than the
cost to the employer, then employment levels will rise but wages will
diminish. Under this scenario, workers are more likely to accept
employment since total benefits will be greater in spite of the
employer's decision to drop wages to cover the cost of the mandated
benefit.310 If the value of the benefit to workers is less than the cost to
the employer, then employment levels and wages will fall. Here,
wage reductions to cover benefit costs will yield compensation that is
acceptable to fewer workers.31
Accommodation mandates, such as Title I, that apply to segments
of the workforce are subject to a different economic dynamic. These
requirements create two labor pools consisting of workers favored by
the new requirement and everyone else.312 The precise effect of the
division of markets depends primarily on whether the rule imposing
accommodations on employers effectively forbids differentials in
employment and wages, that is, prevents employers from refusing to
hire or fire persons in protected categories or from discounting wages
to cover the costs of accommodations. Laws creating accommodation
mandates, such as the ADA, generally have an antidiscrimination
provision that forbids such differentials.31 3 To a labor market analyst,
however, the question is not whether such provisions exist but
whether they are "binding," that is, enforceable.314
Several permutations can arise under the issue of whether man-
dates apply only to targeted groups. For example, mandates may have
binding rules against employment and wage differentials 315 or simply
have nonbinding wage differentials.1 6 Title I, however, falls most
naturally into the category of mandates with a binding rule against
wage but not employment differentials.317 Wage differences between
workers with disabilities and others are easy to detect. The DeLeire
study, notably, found no decrease in wage rates for workers with dis-
309 Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 177 (1989); see also Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 168,
at 230-40 (discussing Summers's economic model).
310 Summers, supra note 309, at 180.
311Id.
312 Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 168, at 240.
313 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (providing a general prohibition on disability
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment).
314 Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 168, at 242.
315 Id. at 243-53.
316 Id. at 257-61.
317 See generally id. at 255-57 (analyzing situations in which a rule is binding on wage but
not employment differentials).
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abilities.3 18 On the other hand-as I argued in Part Il.B-the proce-
dural nature of Title I makes enforcement extremely difficult.319 Pro-
fessor Jolls observes that binding wage restrictions make accommo-
dated workers more expensive to employ. 320 Nonbinding employment
differentials, in turn, permit employers to act on their natural incen-
tive not to hire.32' Put more plainly, employers cannot get away with
paying accommodated workers lower wages or benefits but can wea-
sel out of hiring them. Ironically, targeted workers will be worse off
under this scenario since binding restrictions on wage differentials
will prevent them from accepting jobs whose wages have been re-
duced to reflect accommodation costs.
322
In sum, it appears that Title I's accommodation mandate has
contributed-in a predictable fashion-to diminished employment
opportunities for persons with disabilities. There remains some doubt
about the effects of accommodation costs in the labor market. Some
scholars have attempted to discredit the DeLeire and
Acemoglu/Angrist studies by arguing that they used a "work
limitation" measure of disability that is narrower than the ADA's
323definition and hence inappropriate. The gist of the argument is that
employment levels have actually increased among those who meet the
statutory definition of a qualified individual with a disability. 324
Professor Bagenstos, however, finds these conclusions artificially
narrow since "ADA-qualified" persons represent only a small part of
the group that Congress wished to help325 and because employers are
most likely to consider costs when evaluating workers who require
accommodations to overcome work limitations.326 There may also be
318 DeLeire, supra note 300, at 705.
319 See supra Part Il.B (arguing that the procedural nature of Title I makes enforcement
difficult); see also Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 168, at 275 (noting that the
ADA's rule against employment differentials is difficult to enforce).
320 Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 168, at 255.
3
2 1 Id.
322 Id.
323 See, e.g., Douglas Kruse & Usa Schur, Does the Definition Affect the Outcome?, in
DECLINE 279, supra note 33, at 284-86 (noting numerous criticisms of the DeLeire and Acemo-
glu studies, including the possibilities that the work-limitation measure may be both over- and
underinclusive of the ADA classification); see also Peter Blanck et al., Is It Time To Declare the
ADA a Failed Law?, in DECLINE 301, supra note 33, at 315-18 (describing the definition of
disability as one of a number of problems with the studies).
324 See, e.g., H. Stephen Kaye, Employment and the Changing Disability Population, in
DECLINE 217, supra note 33, (arguing that persons with disabilities who were able to work
experienced increase in employment during the nineties); Kruse & Schur, supra note 323, at
291-92 (noting a 5.9 percent increase in employment of persons with severe functional limita-
tions who could nevertheless work).
325 Bagenstos, Has the ADA Reduced Employment?, supra note 30, at 545.326 See id. at 546 (suggesting that employers may selectively hire disabled workers who do
not need accommodation rather than hiring those that do).
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a relationship between relaxation of SSDI (Social Security Disability
Insurance) eligibility rules327 in the early 1990s and disemployment
among the individuals with disabilities. It is difficult to say, though,
whether the SSDI program lured workers away from the labor market
or cushioned the effects of the accommodation mandate.
Resolving the macroeconomic effects of Title I is not the purpose
of this Article. I am content to treat accommodation costs as a contin-
gent problem to be explored by others (although I am obviously skep-
tical of claims that accommodation costs have no effect on the labor
market). To the extent that the actual or perceived costs of the ac-
commodations interfere with employment opportunities, the civil
rights model embedded in Title I is ill equipped to respond. Unpopu-
lar accommodation mandates must have an effective enforcement
mechanism. Title I's dedication to the traditional model's procedural
approach fails to achieve this necessary precondition to success. The
Act's enforcement methods at the hiring stage have effectively made
the employment of persons who require accommodation optional.328
Equally important, Title I's moral approach to accommodation costs
is so far removed from the dynamics of hiring that many (and perhaps
most) employers are likely to dismiss compliance as a waste of time.
One can expect that personnel managers operating in competitive
industries are keenly aware of marginal labor costs. The average
hourly wage in a Chinese facility is approximately $0.40,329 compared
to the current U.S. minimum wage of $5.15.330
I am not suggesting that there is an easy solution to the problem of
distributing accommodations costs in a highly competitive labor mar-
ket. Some concessions might leave employers more likely to comply
with Title I's hiring and accommodation rules. Perhaps we could limit
the number of workers an employer must accommodate or limit ex-
penditures to a percentage of salary. In the absence of effective en-
forcement, however, it is difficult to imagine that employers would
not continue to act to avoid even reduced costs. A more promising
solution might be a tax credit for accommodation expenditures. 33' A
327 See id. at 550-55 (arguing that changes in SSDI eligibility had a significant effect on the
rising unemployment rate).328 See supra Part 1II.B.
329 William Grimes, Car Clones and Other Tales of the Mighty Economic Engine Known
as China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at E8.
330 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000).
331 Tax credit programs of limited scope already exist. The disabled access tax credit, 26
U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000), permits small businesses a 50 percent tax credit on accessibility expendi-
tures up to $10,250. Eligible small businesses are those with not more than thirty employees or
gross receipts not exceeding $1,000,000 per year. Id. § 44(b). The work opportunity credit, id.
§ 5 1, provides partial tax credits in pertinent part for workers who have been referred by a
vocational rehabilitation agency, id. § 51 (d)(6), and qualified SSI recipients, id. § 51 (d)(9).
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dollar-for-dollar credit would warm the heart of the cruelest cost ac-
countant. Unfortunately, record federal budget deficits make this so-
lution unlikely in the near term.332 In any event, striking a balance
between workplace regulation and subsidy for persons with disabili-
ties will be a challenging process. My purpose in the Article is not to
suggest the ultimate solution; rather, I am suggesting that the process
of reexamining workplace disability policy must begin with the ac-
knowledgment that Title I's unenforceable command to provide ac-
commodations short of undue hardship has not put a dent in the prob-
lem of opening up the workplace to persons with disabilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accommodation requirements are the crux of the Title I's
integrationist agenda. They give life to the social model that underlies
that statute. They attempt to redress the effects of disability that the
social model regards as created or aggravated by the attitudes of
society. Above all, the Act's accommodation program implicitly
recognizes that the defining trait of its protected class is relevant to
bettering their status in society. Title I's reliance on the forms and
structures of the civil rights model, however, inevitably imports
traditional notions of equality. Developed to meet the challenges of
race and gender discrimination, the traditional model views those
defining traits as pointless intrusions into personnel decisions.
Traditional civil rights theories are simply ill suited to carry out an
integrationist agenda for persons with disabilities. Antidiscrimination
is the soul of the civil rights model, embedded in Title VI's
command that employers not let irrelevancies affect personnel
decisions. The soul of the integrationist agenda is affirmative
action-a conscious attempt to consider and react to the ADA
defining quality: disability.
I hope to have shown not only that Title I of the ADA is a mdlange
of equality concepts but also that the antidiscrimination suppositions
of the statute interfere with the accommodationist agenda. Title I is a
flawed, contradictory statute that is unlikely to achieve its
These programs are underutilized owing to a lack of employer awareness. Francine J. Lipman,
Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A Post-integrationist Revision of Underutilized Tax
Incentives, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 393, 418-20 (2003). Ironically, many small firms that might
benefit from these credits are not covered by Title I since they do not employ fifteen or more
persons. Id.332 See Edmund L. Andrews & David E. Rosenbaum, The Big Picture May Seem Rosy, but
the Deficit Is in the Details, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at Al (reporting the Bush Administra-
tion's prediction of a $427 billion federal budget deficit for 2005).
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integrationist goals. The implication of this conclusion is that Title I
needs to be recast as an affirmative action instrument free from the
counterproductive assumptions of the traditional model. If American
society wants to facilitate the integration of persons with disabilities
into the workplace, then its legislation must abandon the goal and
rhetoric of equality and focus disability policy on more direct forms
of assistance. Reconceiving disability policy in this way will come at
a psychological cost. The ADA's goals of advancing equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency are expressions of equality as well as status. It will be
unsettling to set aside this rarely doubted social and legal norm. Yet,
it is not realistic to treat disability as a pertinent defining trait while
employing legal mechanisms that narrow the protection to persons
with the least burdensome conditions; rely on procedural hiring rules
that protect only those with invisible disabilities; and finally, wish
away the economic pressures of the labor market. Difference makes a
difference. The principal statutory statement of disability policy
should be altered to reflect this fact.
There is a role for historical antidiscrimination principles in
disability law. Category I plaintiffs (discussed in Part HIL.A) have
actual or perceived disabilities that do not in fact limit their ability to
work a particular job. In these cases, the defining traits are truly
irrelevant; hence, the disparate treatment provisions of the ADA will
work as well for this subgroup as Title VII works for racial minorities
or women. Here, Title I can make a genuine contribution to the social
goals of promoting personal dignity, avoiding reliance on stereotypes,
and eradicating subtle but demeaning messages of inferiority.
Resolving these types of discrimination does not require a resort to
accommodations.
What should replace Title I? Suggesting the terms of a successor
statute is beyond the realm of this Article. There are alternative strate-
gies that Congress and other should at least consider. Tax credits or
other government subsidies333 come to mind, as do hiring quotas.
334
Each proposal will present challenges, trade-offs, and balances of
333 See, e.g., Sue A. Krenek, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1969,
2012-13 (1994) (suggesting that government pay for costs of accommodations to counter disin-
centives to hire persons with disabilities); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 493 (characteriz-
ing accommodations mandate as an off-budget subsidy and arguing that a federal grant system
would end the "fatal separation of the right to order changes from the duty to pay for them");
Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND WORK
18, 29-30 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) (advocating direct subsidies funded through tax reve-
nues).
334See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, supra note 222, at 142-74 (advocating affirmative action and
job set-asides for persons with disabilities).
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interests. Sending Title I back to Congress is likely to frighten disabil-
ity rights advocates. Those advocates may fear that resulting legisla-
tion will be inferior to the rights now conferred by the ADA. In light
of our experience with accommodation costs under Title I, it is rea-
sonable to expect that concerned entities would quarrel about the al-
location of costs under any successor plan. Proposals for a tax credit
program would have to reckon with the constraints of the federal
budget: credits for accommodations would have to be funded either
by cutting other programs or by deficit spending. Any quota program
would encounter resistance from business interests.
Many of Title I's problems, however, stem from the fact that the
accommodations cost issue was never subjected to realistic political
debate. Judge Newman once complained that Congress's compas-
sionate desire to allow persons with disabilities to work productively
was not matched by practical guidance on burdens of proof in em-
ployment discrimination claims.335 Congress's commitment to assist
individuals with disabilities also seems to have diverted its attention
from the hard realities of accommodation costs. The legislature's op-
timistic belief that accommodations were usually inexpensive-
paired with its moralistic view that withholding accommodations was
wrong-sidetracked serious discussion of Title I's microeconomic
effects. A new political debate over who must shoulder the burdens of
accommodation costs and related issues, such as scope of coverage
under the Act, would be spirited at best and perhaps threatening. But
the result of such a process might be a statute that strikes a workable
compromise among the many interests affected and the desire to im-
prove the employment prospects of persons with disabilities.
335 Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 144 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, C.J.,
concurring).
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